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ABSTRACT OF THESIS

DEBILITATING DEBTS AND RECAPACITATING LOANS:
HOW FINTECH MADE MARKETS FOR UNSECURED CONSUMER DEBT USING
ALTERNATIVE DATA AND MACHINE LEARNING
This thesis investigates the production and management of consumer debt on
digital platforms. First, this study investigates how borrowers navigate spaces of debt and
indebtedness created by fintech consumer lenders. Second, this thesis analyzes the
process and impact of ‘alternative’ data and machine learning on fintech credit scoring
models. As consumer lending ‘moves online’, this research analyzes the increasingly
important role of digital spaces in the creation and management of debt. Tracking the
interfaces and algorithms used by online consumer lenders, I weave together insight from
digital and financial geographies to argue that digital technologies are enabling firms to
marketize new channels and experiences of consumer debt.
KEYWORDS: Fintech, Algorithmic audit, Debt, Credit, Risk assessment, Consumer
lending
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Introduction
This project investigates the production and management of unsecured consumer
debt on fintech platforms. First, this study examines the connections between debt and
debility through interviews with users of personal loans. I conceptualize personal loans as
recapacitating technologies that draw from differential holdings of financial citizenship in
enabling recovery from debt. Second, I use an algorithmic audit (Benjamin, 2019; Brown
et al., 2021; Bucher, 2018; Burrell, 2016; Fields, 2020; Seaver, 2017) to show how the
technologies of fintech consumer lending allow firms to marketize unsecured consumer
debt and create new banking networks. Tracking the experiences of debt as well as the
algorithms and political economies of online consumer lending, I weave together insight
from digital and financial geographies to examine multiple dimensions of fintech
consumer lending. Terms such as Alternative Data or Machine Learning are relatively
new to consumer finance, and as a result require further explanation. To begin the thesis,
the remainder of this section provides context on the fintech industry and associated
terminology central to the project.
1.2 Industry Context
With U.S. consumer debt climbing above $14 trillion, the share of debts
accounted to automobile, credit card, and student loans have grown substantially in the
past decade. Where the percentage of non-housing debt fluctuated between rates of 25%
and 33% of total consumer debt leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, in recent years
non-mortgage debts have rapidly approached 50% of all consumer debt (Federal Reserve,
2020). It’s important to note that while banks and large financial services firms have
accelerated the origination of certain non-mortgage debts, they have been much more
reluctant to reconsolidate credit card debt not secured against the value of an existing
asset (i.e. unsecured loans).
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That dynamic has set the stage for fintech firms to leverage platform technologies
in dis and reintermediating1 (Langley & Leyshon, 2019) interest bearing debt from credit
cards. Over the past decade, U.S. fintech lenders have ushered in a boom in consumer
credit, underwriting nearly $161 billion in consumer loans in 2019 (Michlitsch, 2020;
Rooney, 2019) and over doubling their market share in the past six years (Ennis, 2019).
The important takeaway from that effort is that consumers are now exposed to new types
of debt consolidation products issued almost entirely by online lenders. For borrowers
attempting to get a handle on accumulations of bad debt, they now have a new option—
but the implications of this relatively new pathway out of debt remains unclear.
1.3 Personal Loans
As regulatory adjustments have curbed the payday lending industry (Maloney &
Tempkin, 2019) in recent years, online consumer installment loans have become a
popular alternative for borrowers struggling to finance the costs of everyday life.
Contrasted with payday lending which is structured to capture a portion of the borrowers
paycheck, consumer installment loans disburse a lump sum and set a time table for
monthly repayments. Due to the unsecured nature of installment loans and their ability to
be used for a wide range of expenses, interest rates are usually between 10%-30% on
loans ranging between $1,000-$50,000.
Online installment loans have evolved alongside companies that started in the
Marketplace Lending sector following the 2008 financial crisis (Deloitte, 2016). In recent
years, the industry has experienced a wave of formalization at a time in which regulatory
oversight of predatory lending has eased (CFPB, 2020). Long time peer-to-peer firms
such as Lending Tree, Prosper, and Lending Club are being joined by financial services
companies such as Discover and investment giants Goldman Sachs contributing to a
nearly 20% surge in funding for fintech firms over the past year (Mason, 2021) . With the
growing acceptance of consumer installment loans as a viable financial product for

1

Disintermediation, as defined by Langley and Leyshon (2019) in their analysis of platform capitalism,
leverages platform technology to remove intermediaries from traditional circuits of value (i.e. banks or
financial services firms) while reintermediating those circuits on platforms and charging rents.
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consumers, firms have rebranded the more technical name (installment loan) under the
banner of personal loans.
For the remainder of this thesis, I use the term ‘personal loan’ to refer to the
consumer installment loans outlined in this section. Although installment loans and
personal loans are the same financial product, fintech marketing uses the more digestible
term ‘personal loan’ to refer to unsecured consumer credit offerings. As a result,
borrowers understood their loans in these terms and is how they are discussed in the
interviews referenced in Chapter 4.
1.4 Standard vs. Alternative Credit Scoring
While a detailed history of standard credit scoring is beyond the scope of this
section, standard models for credit scoring generally align with FICO’s (2020) weighted
formula based on traditional financial information such as: payment history (35%),
Amounts owed (30%), Length of credit history (15%), New credit applications (10%),
and Credit mix (10%). These metrics, above all, reflect a borrowers’ existing engagement
with the financial system and provide clear variables for oversight and regulation. While
models such as FICO have been updated in recent years, the standard for many consumer
credit decisions remains the traditional form of credit scoring.
An emergent fintech critique has argued that traditional models reflect existing
racial and gendered inequities in financial access. Citing the large number of U.S. adults
without a credit score as evidence that too many are excluded from financial access,
fintech aligned critique has argued that new methods are needed in order to calculate
scores for a broader range of people (Deng & Gabriel, 2006; Edelberg, 2003, 2006;
Khandani et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 2005). In this way, alternative credit scoring—by
incorporating transaction data, educational attainment, occupation, and other data points
that allow for a greater specification of the borrower—moves beyond a ‘reflection’ of
borrower engagements with the existing financial system, and renders metrics which
enable firms to mitigate risk by accounting for sociality. While that is a large claim, the
predictive power of data associated with educational attainment comes from the social
significance of a degree. These projects of ‘financial inclusion’ require a healthy dose of
skepticism, as Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor (2019) reminds us that previous periods of
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financial inclusion have been inseparable from predatory lending along lines of race,
class, and gender in the U.S.
1.5 Alternative Data
Alternative data is a core component of fintech’s approach to alternative credit
scoring. In a broader context, alternative data can refer to a host of non-standard data
points such as geolocation data, social media analytics, educational attainment or work
history, credit card transactions, or email receipts that are used in credit scoring.
Generally speaking, uses of alternative data not related to lending are less tightly
regulated. For example, the company Neuro-ID provides fraud detection services which
integrate psychometric testing for fraud detection within loan applications. Because these
tests are not used in approving or pricing credit, they are generally allowed by regulators.
In contrast, credit scoring has the tightest regulatory restrictions as a consequence
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act. However, recent
developments (CFPB, 2020) have seen regulatory approval for limited applications of
alternative data in consumer credit. Data points such as education or employment history
are now regularly included within consumer credit decisions. It’s worth emphasizing that
these new data points are useful precisely because they render more social visions of
consumer finance. Whether that is good for borrowers remains up for debate.
1.6 Machine Learning
Machine Learning techniques are a vital component of alternative credit scoring
models. Given the increasingly fractured field of alternative data used in credit decisions,
new machine learning models are needed in order to make meaning out of these datasets.
However, the opacity of machine learning models (Burrell, 2016; Amoore, 2011, 2013)
poses an as yet unanswered question for regulators unsure how to assess compliance
between nonlinear machine learning models and fair lending laws. The push by fintech
firms to expand markets for unsecured consumer debt has been inseparable from analytic
techniques such as neutral network, random forest, or support vector that are needed to
process messy forms of data. .
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1.7 Conclusion
In response to the chorus of technological triumph emanating from tech firms
seeking to inflate valuations (Adkins, 2020), it is important to clarify the frame through
which this work engages three segments of fintech consumer lending infrastructure.
While many participants understood personal loans as an important tool in their recovery
from debt, these recapacitating technologies are inseparable from the credit cards which
generated debt in the first place. As a growing share of working people rely on financial
products such as credit cards, payday, and now personal loans to finance social
reproduction (Langley et al., 2019; Lazzaratto, 2012 & 2015), personal loans enable
recovery from debt at the same time as they renew consumer capacity for cycles of debtbased financial accumulation.
Given regulatory nonaction (CFPB, 2020), firms are likely to leverage recent
success in risk assessments associated with personal loans to expand flexible credit
options with unclear ramifications for consumers. As a result, we should remain
skeptical of the claim that fintech experimentation functions solely to expand the
availability of credit. That is not to say that flexible credit products are not useful to many
borrowers—this research shows that they are—but rather highlights the need for efforts
to rethink the connection between financial products and the political economic forces
defining the terms by which credit is made available to borrowers.
Moving forward, this thesis integrates the terms and concepts illustrated in this
chapter by engaging with three tiers of fintech consumer lending infrastructure: elements
of debility and capacity embedded in personal loans (individual experience), algorithmic
risk assessment and pricing (meso-level system structures), and banking systems
capitalizing this socio-technical assemblage (larger macro, political economy). Coupling
interviews with an algorithmic audit of one fintech firm’s ‘check your rate’ option, I
bridge insight from financial and digital geographies with understandings of debt and
debility outlined in the work of Jasbir Puar (2012; 2013). In understanding individual
experience in this way, this allows me to conceptualize the ways that capacity is
embedded in debt and indebtedness, as well as the pathways of differential inclusion
established for borrowers. For algorithmic structures and the political economies enabling
those structures, I show how advancements in alternative data and machine learning
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models have enabled fintech firms to make markets out of unsecured consumer debt. This
leads me to conceptualize two key points about fintech’s political economy: 1.) fintech
firms are invested as much in the technology for issuing loans as they are in the revenue
of the loans themselves and 2.) that push by firms is creating networks of capitalization
where a variety of financial actors contract with fintech lending technology to access
unsecured consumer lending markets.
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Chapter 2: Fintech consumer lending: Marketizing new channels for debt
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, financial geographers have examined circuits of value in light of
redlining and financial exclusion (Aalbers, 2005; 2007; 2011), retail financial services
(Leyshon et al., 2004; Leyshon & Thrift, 1999), financial crises (Dymski, 2005; 2018),
and more recently securitization and financialization (Pike and Pollard, 2010; Sokol,
2013, 2017; Fields, 2018; Lai, 2018; Wijburg et al., 2018; Aalbers, 2019). This section
connects literature on financialization’s demand for new markets with a framework to
understand consumer debt and indebtedness drawn from disability studies.
The concept of financialization allows us to understand how financial actors,
products, and capital flows become intertwined with “space, the economy, governance,
and everyday life” (Fields, 2018, p. 3). This represents one tool capable of analyzing
diffuse forms of capital (i.e. finance capital) integral to the ordering of everyday space.
However, as Fields (2018) warns us, the potential for financialization to structure
anything and everything risks an understanding of the concept as an explanation rather
than a process. This leaves “black boxed” (Ouma, 2015) the nitty gritty of how financial
markets are put together.
The project of critical economic geography as outlined by Fields (2018) is to
“shine light” on the microgeographical processes constituting financialization, as well as
theorize their significance in terms of “power, politics, and the dynamics of capital
accumulation, i.e. their political economy” (p. 3). This Fields-ian merging of science and
technology studies (STS) with a lived political economic analysis allows for a way out of
the ‘black box’ of financialization by tacking back and forth between technologies
driving marketization (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010) and the political economic forces
orchestrating market driven financial accumulation.
2.2 Fintech consumer lending
As Karen Lai and Michael Samers (2020) show in their recent article outlining a
research agenda for fintech, novel applications of platform technologies, Artificial
Intelligence/Machine Learning (AI/ML), Blockchain, and data analytics have enabled
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new ways of re-intermediating financial capital. Using the concept of a fintech cube to
describe a three-sided combination of actors, technologies, and institutions, the authors
show how fintech has precipitated a contingent but significant effort to rework global
financial networks and dynamics of inclusion/exclusion. Fintech consumer lending is one
piece of that larger fintech ecosystem, often utilizing a combination of platform
technologies, AI/ML, and alternative data analytics to challenge incumbent financial
institutions. The theoretical framework that follows outlines some of the ways we can
understand the various sides of fintech’s cube when applied to consumer lending,
examining actors (borrowers), technologies (lending and risk assessment algorithms), and
institutions (banking networks) that unfold throughout this thesis.
2.3 Marketization in fintech consumer lending
Existing research on marketization has argued that in order to understand markets
we have to center them as objects of study before situating them as sites of critique
(Berndt & Boekler, 2012). Drawing heavily from the STS/ANT inspired work of Koray
Çalışkan and Michel Callon (2009; 2010), economization and marketization feature
prominently in geographic work attempting to understand market construction. This
section establishes a frame for understanding marketization within the fintech sector and
situates recent developments in alternative data and machine learning as socio-technical
market devices driving the attainment of calculative agency over unsecured consumer
debt.
Central to STS inspired market approaches is Callon’s idea of economization.
Through economization, Callon calls for an economic research agenda that abandons ‘the
economy’ as a discrete entity. Instead, he integrates a plural sociality within
understandings of economic processes through which activities, behaviors and spheres or
fields are established as being economic” (Çalışkan & Callon 2009, 370 as cited in
Fields, 2018). By shifting attention away from ‘the economy’ and towards the ways
phenomenon are coded as being economic, this approach allows us to better understand
the performative nature of economic activity and pushes us towards a research agenda
examining how situated economic assemblages are constructed.
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As a subprocess of economization, marketization is the application of this
research agenda within markets (Çalışkan & Callon 2010). Outlining a three pronged
definition of markets as socio-technical assemblages, they write that markets 1.) regulate
the production and consumption of goods, 2.) have rules and embed those rules within
human lives, and 3.) construct dynamics of power and conflict which are resolved
through pricing mechanisms. Functioning as an agencement, or assemblage of economic
processes that render markets performative, marketization allows us to understand how
markets are made. Within the context of fintech consumer lending, this allows us to
examine the technologies enabling risk-based pricing on unsecured consumer debt as
well as the hybrid circuits of new and old finance capitalizing fintech platforms (see:
Chapter 5).
For a market construction to be attained, Çalışkan and Callon highlight the
importance of calculative agency (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010). Within a marketization
framework, calculative agency helps to overcome uncertainty by positioning calculative
technologies in ways that render the appearance of ‘the market’ as a discrete entity.
Construction of new markets relies heavily on investments in new calculative devices
capable of stabilizing and ordering economic activity. For emergent markets to be
connected to channels of capital, calculative agency is employed to stabilize markets in
ways that can hold investment (Fields, 2018). Translating this insight to the case at hand,
online consumer lending has invested heavily in alternative data and machine learning
models to process that data. Consequently, fintech firms have engineered new ways of
credit scoring that enable the marketization of larger segments of consumer debt.
Market devices (Muniesa, Millo & Callon, 2007) are key to Callon’s
understanding of market performativity. These devices range from credit scorecards
(Poon, 2007) to index based-derivatives (Millo, 2007) and enable the orderly facilitation
of markets. Loans as socio-technical objects vary widely in their terms and structure, but
as Langley et al. (2019) show us, the ordering properties of loans upon consumer lives
can embed market relations within financial products. Conceptualizing loans as market
devices opens space for tracking how financial products embed notions of money, debt,
and citizenship within the lives of consumers. These processes unfold in fintech
consumer lending via financial products capable of recapacitating borrowers in their
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management of debt in order to reintegrate consumers within markets and retain market
citizenship (see: Chapter 4).
Geographers of markets have used these insights to situate market assemblages as
contested and contingent objects of study (Berndt & Boekler, 2009; 2011). That
contingency positions practice oriented approaches as diagnosing the formation of market
orders. On the one hand, as Fields (2018) shows us, this work is political in the sense that
it understands market regimes as fundamentally open to alteration. These projects are
contested and require significant labor (both calculative and otherwise) in bringing
together a socio-technical assemblage, or agencement. Unearthing the politics of an STS
inspired approach to markets involves diagnosing the formation of markets within an
epistemic field of contingency. That emphasis on contingency allows for a diagnosis of
market order that can be reformulated in ways to channel value away from hegemonic
market actors and towards everyday people.
2.4 Debt, debility, and capacity in consumer lending
What practice oriented approaches to market formation can leave out is an
attention to the underlying logics of dispossession driving capitalist markets. While this is
a bold claim, and many authors writing within STS oriented approaches fully understand
the capitalist drive behind market formation, some choose to reject the sequence of
abstractions embedded in political economic analysis out of a commitment to
understanding the performative ways market technologies work. However, for a study
examining economic phenomenon (debt) rooted in colonial dispossession and racial
capitalism (Park, 2016), it is necessary to find ways of bridging the practice oriented
approaches adopted by economic and financial geographies with insight from disability
studies. This engagement allows for a better understanding of capacitating and
debilitating relations embedded in consumer debt.
For a study of online consumer lending, credit and personal indebtedness play a
central role. Under contemporary capitalism, scholars have theorized the increasing
centrality of debt, even going so far as to suggest that credit-debt relations have surpassed
wage relations as the foundational axis through which capitalism reproduces itself
(Lazzaratto, 2012; 2015). In pursuit of the productivity enabled by credit-debt, online
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consumer lenders have made debt consolidation a core component of their business
models. Unlike banks, which usually hold the debts that borrowers look to consolidate,
online consumer lenders have been willing to refinance accumulations of toxic credit
card, automobile, or medical debt in a play to marketize debts held by incumbent
financial institutions.
With that frame of consumer debt in mind, I bring insight from disability studies
into conversation with financial geographies. This move allows us to better understand
many (although by no means all) of the relations embedded in debt. In particular, I
highlight Jasbir Puar’s (2012; 2013; 2017) work which centers on the idea of
capacity/debility in order to conceptualize the idea of debt-as-debility. Arguing that debt
is a disabling/enabling technology, Puar argues that uneven economic debilitation is
central to the maintenance of a contemporary biopolitics of financialization. In this way,
recovery (or debilitation) from debt becomes “another register to measure the capacity for
recovery” (2012, p. 154). That notion of capacity and debility drawn from disability
studies, I argue, is a central component of personal loans and determines how financial
products distributed by fintech firms differentially enable the recovery from toxic debt.
For those unable to recover from exposures to toxic debt, Puar (2012) develops
the concept of differential inclusion to explain the ways in which debilitated financial
citizens are integrated within predatory circuits of consumer finance. Recovery, in these
terms, means the reintegration within asset based capitalism (Adkins et al., 20202;
Muniesa & Birch, 2020) and accumulation of those ‘good debts’ which generate wealth.
Financial debility on the other hand represents the differential inclusion of borrowers
within predatory circuits of consumer finance in order to fund social reproduction via
products such as payday loans, credit cards, and now personal loans.
To ground that idea, Charron and Seamster (2020) find that the same debts (such
as a mortgage or auto loan) can function differently when overlaid atop racialized axes of
difference. As I will argue later (see: Chapter 4), financial debilitation or recapacitation
from personal loans engages financial citizenship in differentially translating debts into
either ‘good’ (and asset accruing) or ‘bad’ (and debilitating). Incorporating these lived
dynamics of debt conceptualized through disability studies is central to the project at
hand, and when coupled with practice oriented approaches to marketization, allows for a

11

nuanced understanding of the online consumer lending industry, it’s political economic
ramifications, and the lived dimensions of borrowers working to finance social
reproduction.
2.5 Conclusion
In the following section, I present the methodology designed to enact this
theoretical approach. Drawing from dual methods aligning with the framework illustrated
in this section, I first employ semi-structured interviews with borrowers recruited from
Reddit financial self-help forums to theorize elements of debility and capacity transmitted
by personal loans. Second, I use an algorithmic audit to assess the impact of alternative
data and machine learning models in enabling fintech firms to create markets for
unsecured consumer debt. Combined, these approaches allow me to understand how
borrowers are navigating financial products developed by fintech firms, as well as the
ways fintech risk assessment is creating new markets for unsecured consumer debt.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
3.1 Introduction
To access the dual political economic and market oriented frameworks outlined in
the theoretical framework, the methodology for this project targets the lived experience
of debt and indebtedness for consumers, as well as the marketization of consumer debt by
fintech firms.
Each approach is designed to access a different strand of fintech consumer lending. When
combined, these paralleled trajectories tell a story about how financial products are
experienced and how revenue generated from these products is incorporated within a
growing market for unsecured consumer debt.
In interviewing borrowers, my goal is to better understand the ways new financial
products are shaping consumer relations to debt. Given the platformed nature of fintech
consumer lending, contacting borrowers presented a significant challenge. As a result,
much of the methodological discussion pertaining to these interviews will focus on the
strategies employed to identify borrowers, the limitations imposed by platform
architecture, and broader questions around platform methods.
Similarly, understanding how fintech consumer lenders are rating and pricing risk
posed a significant challenge. While industry leaders regularly reference the impact of
new technologies on fintech lending, there are no readily available ways to assess the
impact of alternative data and machine learning on consumer credit. For the purposes of
this thesis, alternative data is defined as non-traditional credit data such as education or
employment history not normally incorporated within consumer credit reports2. These
new data points are analyzed using machine learning models, which deviate from the
standard regression based analytical techniques while drawing from broader and more
diffuse fields of data (Amoore, 2011; 2013).
Turning to experimental methods to assess these two objects of analysis, I am
informed by a recent audit from the Student Borrower Protection Center (2020) which
2

The traditional FICO score from the accounting firm Fair, Isaac and Company is the most popular
example of this model for credit scoring. Under this model, credit scores are calculated through a weighted
formula based on traditional financial information such as: payment history (35%), Amounts owed (30%),
Length of credit history (15%), New credit applications (10%), and Credit mix (10%).
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tested one fintech platform for racial discrimination associated with where a borrower
graduated from college. Findings drawn from this audit illustrate one way in which an
algorithmic audit can be designed, the choices made to conduct that audit, and the
research ethics of inputting manufactured information to test algorithmic models
associated with credit approvals and pricing.
3.2 Semi-structured interviews
In order to assess the impact of new financial instruments on consumer lives, I
conducted semi-structured interviews with borrowers who had applied for an online
personal installment through a fintech consumer lending company. Participants were
recruited through reddit, where I searched for posts relating to personal loans and
contacted participants via direct message (DM). Eligibility for the study was defined as
having taken, or being in the process of taking, a loan from a lender which offers personal
loans through an online portal. These loans were unsecured, meaning they were not
secured against the value of an existing asset, and often varied between three and five
year terms. These interviews are situated with a recent line of scholarship that
understands debt as a powerful social relation; one that disciplines individual monetary
practices and orchestrates capitalist investment in everyday life (Langley, et al., 2019;
Charron-Seamster, 2020). As a result, interview scripts were designed for openness,
allowing borrowers to reflect on their reason for taking a personal loan and how it fit
within their financial lives. Common themes in the script asked borrowers to reflect upon
the time in their life they took the loan and how it got them to where they were at the time
of the interview.
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3.2.1 Recruitment

Figure 3.1: Screenshot of recruitment website hosted on Github.
In preparation to recruit participants, I designed a web page on Github that
contained a description of the study and an embedded contact form to volunteer. This
form collected contact information, details about the loan and lender, and a set of times to
sign up for an interview. Some participants preferred not to use the form and instead
coordinated directly over the Reddit messaging application. For borrowers who filled out
the form, I contacted them by email to confirm a time, provide informed consent, and
pass along a Zoom link. Borrowers who coordinated with me over reddit provided their
email address and I messaged them directly. Following the interviews, participants were
paid a sum of twenty-five dollars distributed to their Venmo accounts or by postal mail.
Given the strained financial situations of many borrowers with whom I spoke, coupled
with the difficulty of contacting people online, payment for the interviews was both
practical and ethical.
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Limitations on participant recruitment centered around platform architecture and
the ability of companies to mask when and where people receive loans. Unlike banks or
even payday lenders, the origination of personal loans happens entirely online. In order to
contact borrowers, I conducted a digital participant observation (Pink, 2016) of various
social media platforms such as Facebook, Reddit, and Twitter on forums regularly
discussing personal loans. Reddit forums such as r/personalfinance, r/povertyfinance,
r/wallstreetbets, and r/signupsforpay were the most active in discussing personal loans.
Additionally, each subreddit articulated its own variety of financial citizenship. The
majority of participants (11 out of 14) were recruited from r/personalfinance and
r/povertyfinance which offer financial advice on a broad set of topics ranging from
extreme indebtedness and bankruptcy to more mundane questions like where to look for a
loan.
It should be noted that r/personalfinance and r/povertyfinance articulate two
distinct forms of financial citizenship important to the study. The advice from
r/personalfinance is decidedly more middle-class and invokes respectability as a central
component of how to recover from toxic financial situations. Advice from this subreddit
often revolves around budgeting, careful money management, and taking on additional
part-time employment as seen below:
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Figure 3.2: Screenshot of an advice thread from Reddit’s r/personalfinance.
As one interviewee remarked when asked if she was signed up to r/personalfinance, “I
think that’s a problem… that particular sub is all people who are all pretty middle class,
and might not have the issue of being perpetually in debt”. When contrasted with
r/povertyfinance, she thought r/povertyfinance had “people that get it. It’s people that
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don’t say ‘Oh, well take 20% of your paycheck every week and put it in your 401K’
when it’s like, ‘I have to feed my family’’” (Interview 9, 2020).
Contrasted with r/personalfinance, the sentiment from povertyfinance was more
sympathetic to the difficult and sometimes impossible decisions that arise from debt (i.e.
“I have to feed my family”). These threads were frequently less critical of people seeking
out personal loans.

Figure 3.3: Screenshot of an advice thread from Reddit’s r/povertyfinance.
In alignment with the screenshot, responses to posts about personal loans on
r/povertyfinance were generally more helpful. Careful explanations of how a financial
product worked or the merits behind refinancing debt were not uncommon. More
directly, redditors on povertyfinance were much more skeptical of the neoliberal ethic
18

that budgeting and careful money management were the most direct paths out of debt
(this was common on r/personalfinance). Frequently, posters would acknowledge the
seemingly obvious fact that many people lack the income to pay back their debts,
regardless of conservative budgeting or money management.
The difference between r/personalfinance and r/povertyfinance is important
because each subreddit articulates a different approach to personal loans. More
importantly, the contrast seen during my participant observation worked alongside
borrower reflections to help conceptualize differential outcomes associated with personal
loans. The various forms of financial citizenship messaged over digital platforms such as
reddit connect to the debilitated but present forms of financial access discussed in
Chapter 5.
3.2.2. Interview sample
Once participants were recruited, interviews were conducted via Zoom with 14
users of online personal loans. Participants varied in age between 48 and 23 with an
average age of 29. Four out of the fourteen identified as female and eight identified as
male with two preferring not to answer. Nine out of the fourteen identified as White, two
identified as Latino/a, one identified as Native American, and two preferred not to
answer. Given the importance of educational attainment as a variable hypothesized to
impact lending outcomes, I recorded the educational attainment of borrowers. Nearly half
of participants had either a Master’s (n=2) or a Bachelor’s (n=4) degree, although a
substantial portion reported their educational attainment as Some College or a High
School Diploma (n=6).
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ID
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Table 3.1: Summary demographic data from borrower interviews
Age
Gender
Race and/or Ethnicity
Highest Ed.
30 Male
Latino
Bachelors
No response No response No response
No response
23 Male
White
Masters
27 Male
White
Associates
23 Female
White
High school
30 Female
White
Bachelors
26 Male
White
Masters
24 Female
White
Bachelors
31 Male
White
Bachelors
32 Female
White
Bachelors
26 Male
Latino
Masters
48 Male
White
Some college
No response No response No response
No response
32 Male
Native American
High school

While this study attempted to recruit as much diversity as possible, the nature of platform
lending imposed significant constraints on recruitment. Additionally, it limited whether I
was able to know if the sample was consistent with broader trends in consumer lending.
As a result, I attempted to contact an interview sample which drew from ‘standard’ and
‘non-standard’ use cases of personal loans (as identified through participant observation
on these subreddits). This approach was successful in recruiting borrowers with a diverse
mixture of educational attainment but lacked racial—and to a lesser extent—gendered
diversity.
The sample limits my ability to make claims about the experiences of debt and
indebtedness for people of color. However, following Michelle Murphy’s (2006) call to
study racial privilege, or the ways race is invoked within socio-technical systems without
ever being named, I argue that personal loans draw from a debilitated but present form of
financial citizenship in enabling recovery from toxic debts. That citizenship is enabled by
racialized histories of consumer finance that manifest within consumer orientations
towards debt, namely the inclination and confidence of white middle class borrowers’ to
take on more debt in order to get out of debt (Charron-Seamster, 2020).
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3.2.3 Transcription and analysis
After interviews were conducted, a recording was downloaded from Zoom and
transcripts were automatically generated by the service. These transcripts were heavily
edited to clarify moments that the transcription service did not pick up, as well as to
clarify key points and ideas. Each interview was coded for three thematics: 1.)
experiences with debt, 2.) notions of financial citizenship, 3.) contrast with online loans
vs. in person lending. Each code was later pasted into an analysis document and analyzed
to produce key thematics on debt and financial citizenship in Chapter 4 and experiences
with online banking in Chapter 5.
3.2.4 Implications
Research on the financial geography of platform lending faces a variety of
challenges regarding participant visibility and limited understandings of the sector. The
above section is meant to offer one way which I attempted to navigate these challenges
by recruiting through paralleled online platforms. Platform methods (Bucher, 2018;
Fields, 2020) are critical to engaging issues of contemporary importance, and further
work is needed on how we can effectively conduct studies with participants obfuscated
by platform architecture.
3.3 Auditing platform infrastructure
Drawing from recent investigative work by the Student Borrower Protection
Center (SPBC), I conduct an algorithmic audit of one fintech lender—Upstart’s —check
your rate’ option. Upstart was chosen because of its central role in expanding the use of
alternative data and machine learning models in consumer credit. Recently, Upstart
received a ‘no-action’ letter from regulators tacitly approving the integration of selective
alternative data points and machine learning models (CFPB, 2020). The SBPC’s report
investigated that approach and showed that a hypothetical borrower with a B.S. from
majority Black Howard University was much more likely to receive an inflated rate when
compared to the same hypothetical borrower from majority white New York University.
Building from this work, I use multiple volunteers to test a series of profiles designed to
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identify which categories of alternative data may have an impact on loan approvals and
credit pricing.
An algorithmic audit (Benjamin, 2019; Brown et al., 2021; Bucher, 2018; Burrell,
2016; Fields, 2020; Seaver, 2017) leverages experimental methods and study design to
illuminate pieces of platform infrastructure. The knowledge produced by audits is
inherently partial on account of limited access to the technologies tested, but is useful in
the sense that experimental methods illustrate how these technologies translate into
everyday user settings. Within the context of fintech consumer lending, I conducted an
algorithmic audit of credit decisioning models through a series of 58 intentionally
designed platform profiles. (see Appendix A for a full list of parameters used in each
profile). Similar to the SBPC study, I tested for differences in credit pricing associated
with educational attainment, but broadened the pool of volunteers from one to twelve in
order to incorporate a diversity of underlying credit histories. The data from the
algorithms reaction to these profiles was used in producing graphics and tables
illustrating the significance of alternative data and machine learning in credit decisioning.
3.3.1 Probing platform infrastructure
Before designing test profiles, I leveraged the openness of Upstart’s interface to
recreate their application in an excel spreadsheet. This allowed me to track the
volunteered information requested by the platform and begin to document which
variables might have an impact on loan approval and credit pricing. Many of the
variables in Upstart’s application connected to an underlying database through a series of
drop down menus which auto-populated with higher education institutions as seen below:

22

Figure 3.4: is a screenshot from Upstart’s application which populates with a list of
universities as you complete the application.
Given the stated importance of alternative data on credit decisioning, variables which
appeared to connect to outside databases were prioritized for testing. Three categories of
variables had similar drop down menus on their section of the application. Those were
associated with where a borrower lived, where they went to school, and where they
worked. As a result, these were chosen for further testing.
3.3.2 Designing test profiles
Using the spreadsheet as a starting point, I designed profiles to test the
significance of three main categories of alternative data. Those variables associated with
education, employment status, and ZIP code were recorded in the context of a potential
applicant living in neighborhoods of Memphis, Tennessee. Memphis was chosen because
of the author’s familiarity with the city and the stark levels of economic and racial
segregation present in these neighborhoods. The goal was to manipulate alternative data
such as location, education, or employment status, while holding constant data associated
with a borrower’s underlying financial situations such as loan amount, income, and
existing assets.
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Table 3.2: List of manipulated and control variables used in algorithmic audit.

Controlling for financial information such as income or assets allowed me to
isolate the impact of alternative data on loan approval and credit pricing. It is important to
note that the financial information in this table represents a borrower in a stable financial
situation, which was not the case for many I spoke with in interviews; however, due to
the constraints imposed by algorithmic platform security, I found that profiles reflecting
more stable financial situations were less likely to be removed by platform security As a
result, profiles were tested in the following order.
Table 3.3: List of changed variables used in audit, listed in order profiles were tested.
Profile ID Zip Code
NBH
Ed
Ed Inst
Income
Industry
1
38107 NM
BA
UM
Salary
Ins Sales
2
38138 GT
BA
UM
Salary
Ins Sales
3
38107 NM
CT
EBS
Hourly
Barber
4

38107 NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

5

38107 NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

6

38107 NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

To test for differences associated with location, two Memphis neighborhoods
were chosen as a result of the authors’ familiarity with Memphis and its neighborhoods.
North Memphis (38107) is a neighborhood on the north side of Memphis which is 79%
percent African-American and 18% White with a median income of $29, 192.
Germantown (38138) is a municipal area in Memphis’ eastern suburbs which is 5%
percent African-American and 87% white with a median income of $105, 292 (ACS,
2019). In a majority Black city, these two neighborhoods reflect mirrored histories of
racial segregation and public disinvestment that have driven disinvestment in Memphis’
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northern and southern neighborhoods while funneling wealth towards the city’s majority
white suburbs in East Memphis. The first series of profiles tested for differences
associated with the ZIP code for each neighborhood, and was recorded in an excel
spreadsheet.
Employment is a variable with potentially rich applications of alternative data.
For Upstart’s platform, they require two pieces of alternative data associated with
employment: industry and income source. This audit primarily tested profiles for
differences in loan approval and credit pricing associated with income source, examining
whether hourly workers received worse outcomes than salaried workers. I chose to test
for differences associated with income source because of increasing wealth stratification
associated with hourly vs. salaried work. However, it should be noted that future audits
might test for impacts associated with an applicant’s industry, as platform security
measures limited my ability to test both industry and income source.
Going into the experiment, the SBPC (2020) report provided a baseline for
understanding how education might impact Upstart’s lending algorithm. In particular, I
wanted to test education as a broad category of alternative data across a variety of
profiles. As a result, I chose the University of Memphis as the institution which would
provide BA degrees in Finance and Empire Beauty School of East Memphis as the
institution which would provide Certificate degrees in cosmetology.
3.3.3 Volunteering for the audit
Given that lenders combine traditional credit data tied to the identity of a
borrower with volunteered alternative data such as education or employment history, it
was important to incorporate a range of traditional and alternative data. Once profiles
were designed, I recruited twelve close contacts to run simulated profiles through
Upstart’s publicly available ‘check your rate’ option3. It’s important to clarify that a
‘check your rate’ option is not the same as applying for a loan. Upstart makes this clear in
their terms of service, and any offer issued by the ‘check your rate’ tool is only an

3

Naming a profile after someone included using their first and last name, in addition to their date of birth.
A real address or social security number were neither used nor recorded. The names of profiles
referenced in this project are not the names of volunteers.
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estimate of a loan. This process is similar to credit card companies that preapprove offers
and distribute them through postal mail, or credit aggregators like Credit Karma and
NerdWallet which constantly monitor your credit to preapprove you for offers. The
choice to name profiles after people with real credit histories was a result of platform
security that limited the amount any individual could check their rate in a given time
period. Additionally, having a mixture of underlying credit information allowed me to
test categories of alternative data and record the differential impacts when applied across
a variety of credit histories.
3.3.4 Navigating platform security
Automated platform security imposed significant constraints on the study and
represented one of the primary challenges to this research. Platform security did not allow
me to run all profiles under my own name. Generally, one person could check their rate
twice per day before the platform identified the application and connected it to a previous
rate estimate. Further, profiles whose rate estimates were denied were guaranteed to be
detected by the platform and not allowed to reapply for a period of 30 days. For this
reason, profiles which were denied were not able to be retested.
The logistics of navigating algorithmic security meant that the study adapted its
method in coordination with platform limitations. I realized from preliminary tests that
profiles were most likely to be denied when their educational attainment was below a
bachelor’s degree. As a result, I prioritized testing profiles with a bachelor’s degree. The
first variable I explored was location (the two different zip codes) with all profiles
reflecting a bachelor’s degree and a job as an insurance sales agent. I next tested
education and employment profiles in this order while keeping industry constant:
certificate- hourly/barber, bachelors- salary/insurance agent, bachelors- salary/hairstylist,
and certificate- hourly/hairstylist.
Under ideal circumstances, I would have run a second set of employment profiles
testing for differences associated with industry. However, platform security limited my
ability to run these additional profiles. Instead, I matched profiles from the location
dataset with an identical profile from the employment dataset (see Appendix for the
parameters used for each of the six profile-types used across twelve different people).
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The only difference in these profiles was the time at which they were tested (roughly two
weeks apart) and the industry classification associated with the profile (insurance sales
agent vs. barber/hairstylist). Combining two series of profiles is an imperfect and
incomplete way of accessing this data, but exemplifies the sorts of methodological
flexibility required to navigate platform security measures while conducting an
algorithmic audit.
3.3.5 Analyzing imperfect data
The experiment outlined in this section produced results assessing the impact of
alternative data on fintech consumer lending; however, it’s important to note that
algorithmic audits produce partial and suggestive results. Data was recorded and analyzed
in order to produce a series of tables and charts showing the impacts of alternative data
on loan approval rates and credit pricing (see: Appendix A for a full list of profiles and
the variables used to audit Upstart’s algorithm). Even educational attainment, which the
profiles showed to be the most impactful use of alternative data, is not conclusive.
Instead, we have to take these suggestive results and incorporate them within a broader
understanding of the fintech consumer lending industry, contextualizing firms aims and
objectives for incorporating new technologies with the data presented in these profiles.
Relatedly, the audit allowed for identification of the bank sponsor underlying each
rate estimate provided by Upstart. This was an unexpected finding and allowed me to
further investigate the sponsor of loans by cross referencing bank names with call report
data from the FDIC. The identification of bank sponsors allowed me to investigate the
financial networks underlying fintech firms. In this way, algorithmic audits can produce
unexpected results that provide insight into the underlying logic and infrastructure
enabling a particular algorithmic system.
While this approach does not allow us to know everything inside the ‘black box’
of algorithmic decisioning (Fields, 2020), we can learn valuable information about firms
and their development of new technologies. Given the complex set of choices and
decisions that went into crafting these profiles, my analysis in Chapter 5 will frequently
reference Appendix A in order to connect the reader to the variables used in the audit.
Integrating this approach allows me to conceptualize some of the reasons why users may
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have been more likely to be denied a loan or experience higher rates. That understanding
is coupled with an analysis of the financial circuits created by new technologies and their
capacity to change the ways we measure and assess risk in consumer lending.
3.4 Conclusion
In the following chapter, I connect elements of consumer finance with literature
and theories drawn from disability studies. This segment of the project accesses
individual experiences tied to the phenomenon of fintech consumer lending, and works to
understand how these experiences of debt and indebtedness feed into the larger sociotechnical infrastructure of fintech platform lending. Ultimately, I argue the experiences of
borrowers in this study connect to macro (political economy of banks) and meso level
structures (algorithmic risk assessment systems) of consumer lending through the way it
suggests difference is embedded within consumer finance. Illustrating notions of capacity
via disability studies allows me to show personal loans become a prism through which we
can see the conversion of debt into ‘good’ or ‘bad’ assets depending on the resources
which borrowers were able to mobilize in repaying their loan.
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Chapter 4: Debilitating debts and recapacitating loans in online consumer lending
4.1 Introduction
Platform lenders have targeted debt consolidation as a core component of their
business model. Unlike banks, which hold the debts that borrowers often consolidate,
fintech lenders have been willing to refinance accumulations of toxic credit card,
automobile, or medical debt. Distinct from debts accumulated via mortgages, auto loans
or credit cards—personal loans animate existing accumulations of debt. For borrowers,
personal loans were often experienced as a lifeline or way out of unmanageable credit
card debt; however, for those whom these recapacitating technologies failed, debts were
reaccumulated and feelings of indebtedness intensified.
Following the introduction, this section has three components. The first section
provides an overview of methods and context around the study. The second section lays
out a theoretical framework for understanding debt and capacity by engaging with the
work of Jasbir Puar to analyze the elements of capacity circuited through debt. The third
section draws from interviews with borrowers to argue that fintech personal loans
function as recapacitating technologies for borrowers exposed to toxic accumulations of
debt. Debt is understood through Puar’s (2012) lens of debt-as-debility, invoking the
neoliberal imperative to govern the biopolitics of recapacitation. I conclude this section
with reflections on borrowers whom these recapacitating technologies failed and argue
for an understanding of difference within the mechanics of how loans differentially
capacitate/incapacitate financial citizenship for borrowers.
4.2 Methods
The study draws from 14 semi-structured interviews with users of personal loans
in the United States. These were conducted over a 2 month period in the summer of 2020.
Unlike traditional loans from a bank, or even predatory loans from a payday lender,
personal loans are almost exclusively issued online. This presented several
methodological challenges for study to navigate.
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Given the “black box” (Fields et al., 2020; Ouma, 2015) of financialization more
broadly, and of online lending in particular, I turned to reddit subforums as sites where
borrowers were discussing the repayment of personal loans. By contacting participants
over reddit, I was able to confirm through prior posting history that borrowers had taken a
personal loan. Further, I was often able to see information about the borrower’s reason
for taking a loan and their experiences with the lender. As a result, I contacted a wide
range of borrowers, attempting to scope out common (debt consolidation) and uncommon
(investments or income from promotional offers) uses of personal loans.
While this sample is not representative of consumer lending as a whole, or even
personal loans in particular, it represents an intentionally selected sampling of borrowers
informed by a digital archaeology (Pink et al., 2016) of the subreddits r/personalfinance
and r/povertyfinance. These subreddits message a particular idea of financial subjecthood
that encourages borrowers to adopt middle class financial values in navigating debt and
indebtedness. Further, the sample was supported by research on the structure of fintech
firms showing that debt consolidation is a primary avenue through which fintech attempts
to carve out space against incumbent financial institutions.
Once contact was made with borrowers, they were directed to a website which
hosted an informed consent letter and an initial intake survey. These questions asked for
details about their loan and lender as well as contact information for a follow up
email/phone call. Some participants preferred not to fill out the survey and requested that
I communicate with them over reddit in scheduling the interview. For those who
completed the survey, I would schedule a time for an interview over the phone or via
Zoom. All 14 interviews were conducted over Zoom and the call was recorded for
accuracy.
Given the effort to include a range of perspectives on online lending, the semistructured interview script was designed to follow the intensely personal feelings of debt.
As a result, interviewees were encouraged to articulate their individual relationships to
debt by talking about the time in their lives where they took the loan and the potential
futures they understood loans to either close or open. Consequently, this is a paper about
market assemblages of political economic debt that force consumers into circuits of
dispossession, but, at the same time, it is also a paper about the hopes and futures
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borrowers imagine as attached to loans as they struggle in recovering from exposures to
toxic debt.
4.3 Theoretical framework
At the same time fintech lenders are popularizing a wave of new flexible credit
options, borrowers continue to navigate an economy powered by consumer spending.
With U.S. consumer debt climbing above $14 trillion, the share of debts accounted for by
automobile, credit card, and student loans is growing. Where the percentage of nonhousing debt fluctuated between rates of 25% and 33% of total consumer debt leading up
to the 2008 financial crisis, in recent years non-mortgage debts have rapidly approached
50% of all consumer debt (Federal Reserve, 2020). These debts provide little to no longterm value to borrowers yet function as the engine upon which neoliberal economies are
built.
As a consequence, managing debt and indebtedness under that system has become
a defining feature of market citizenship. Theorizing the centrality of credit-debt relations,
Mauricio Lazzarratto (2012; 2015) argues that the dominance of finance capital coupled
with the diffusion of credit-debt relations has come to supplant labor relations as the
central axis through which capitalism reproduces itself. In this literature, borrowers face
increasing precarity from the contraction of formal waged labor opportunities and turn to
financialized sources of credit-debt to meet the costs of social reproduction. This situates
credit-debt relations as instrumental to financing social reproduction, with borrowers
turning to credit cards, payday cash advances, and now personal loans as a way of
financing existence.
Engaging with that framework, Langley et al. (2019) offers a frame through
which we can understand the relations embedded in technologically mediated financial
products. Looking at the High-Cost Short-Term Credit (HCSTC) industry in the United
Kingdom, Langley argues that online payday lending embeds a particular monetary
relation within payday loans. That relation is an understanding of debt as money. As
borrowers come to understand payday loans in monetary terms, they are incentivized to
use debt as a form of financialized social reproduction. In this way, we can understand
fintech personal loans as social technologies transmitting relations through debt.
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With that frame of consumer finance in mind, Jasbir Puar (2012; 2013; 2017)
centers capacity in understanding debt-as-debility. Arguing that debt is a disabling
technology, Puar argues that uneven economic debilitation is central to the maintenance
of a biopolitics rooted in financialization. In this way, recovery (or debilitation) from debt
becomes “another register to measure the capacity for recovery” (2012, p. 154). That
notion of capacity and debility drawn from disability studies, I argue, is a central
component of personal loans and determines how financial products distributed by
fintech firms differentially enable the recovery from toxic debt.
For those unable to recover from exposures to toxic debt, Puar (2012) develops
the concept of differential inclusion to explain the ways in which debilitated financial
citizens are integrated within predatory circuits of consumer finance. Recovery, in these
terms, means the reintegration within asset based capitalism (Muniesa & Birch, 2020)
and the accumulation of ‘good debts’ that generate wealth. Financial debility, in these
terms, means the differential inclusion of borrowers within predatory circuits of
consumer finance in order to fund social reproduction through products such as payday
loans, credit cards, and now personal loans.
To ground that idea, Charron and Seamster (2020) find that the same debts (such as a
mortgage or auto loan) can function differently when overlaid atop racialized axes of
difference. As I will show in this chapter, financial recapacitation or debilitation from
personal loans engages financial citizenship in differentially translating debts into either
‘good’ (asset accruing) or ‘bad’ (debilitating). Incorporating these lived dynamics of debt
conceptualized through disability studies is central to the project at hand.
4.4 Debt and Capacity
Given the centrality of credit card spending in creating a need for personal loans,
this section reads the experiences of (mostly credit card) debt for borrowers through a
lens of capacity drawn from Jasbir Puar’s work on debt-as-debility. Flexible lines of
credit such as cards allow for consumers to spend beyond current income in financing
social reproduction; however, when flexible spending turns to debt, companies can
charge exorbitant interest rates for any balance remaining on the card. Because balances
can be left on a card without defaulting, borrowers become entrapped within a
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debilitating cycle of minimum payments on interest without being able to pay down the
principal. Consequently, credit cards as essential consumer credit technologies are
productive of indebted relations excessive of the cards themselves.
Borrowers regularly discussed the persistence of credit card debt and its affects as
inhibiting their ability to invest in retirement, attain homeownership, take a new job, or
access general peace of mind. This section scopes out a framework by which we can
understand the spillovers of debt from credit cards into personal loans. Understanding
accumulations of credit card debt as a site of exposure (Murphy, 2006; 2017), I argue
toxic accumulations of debt unevenly expose borrowers to financial debilitation. Debt,
when understood in this sense, is not simply one thing, but rather many relationships that
take on a different form when channeled through variegated technologies, subjects, and
fields of power.
Under this paradigm, credit-debt relations are understood as enabling/inhibiting
the attainment of an idealized financial citizenship. As Rachel, a borrower in her early
20s responded in emphasizing the importance of credit, “I started building my credit
really young, because it’s important to be able to do anything in life” (Interview 2, 2020,
emphasis is mine). The idea that proper management of credit-debt is a fundamental
value of financial citizenship was persistent throughout the interviews. Many participants
expressed shame at having spent years building credit before an unexpected life event or
experience with illness threw them into debt:
So in my mind, there is this battle that I was proud of and felt stable with credit
and being financially responsible and now… in many respects, I'm not anybody.
And I know you're not a therapist, but that’s something that I’ve had to grapple
with a little bit without financial stability or security, I haven’t had anything else.
I’ve been kind of just floating around trying to find that… going back to school
and other things. Like that’s something that I equated strongly with myself for
whatever reason, I guess, I don’t know. (Interview 1, 2020)
For Reggie and many others, exposure to toxic debt was “pretty shameful, personally for
me from a point of pride” (Interview 1, 2020) in the way it incapacitated long held values
of financial citizenship. That incapacitation extended beyond pride and limited Reggie’s
ability to mobilize financial resources in navigating a way out of a traumatizing
experience with gambling.

33

Driving home this idea that proper management of credit-debt is constitutive of
economic capacity—Tina, who had enrolled personal credit cards in helping her business
through a rough patch, remarked, “I’ll be honest, I rely on this money. I see all of my
lines of credit as extensions of what I'm able to do in the moment” (Interview 5, 2020).
Similarly, other borrowers expressed sentiments tying their ability/inability to act “in the
moment” with accumulations of debt:
I was looking at the Peace Corps, and so I was kind of like ‘the only thing holding
me back from doing that is this debt’. You know, I can’t… If I leave, I mean I
guess I can just leave, but then it’s going to destroy me whenever I come back.
And so I kind of looked at [debt consolidation] as if I want to be able to say, in
two years… if I want to just get up and leave, I can do that (Interview 7, 2020).
Exposure to debt and costs associated with moving had limited Stephen’s capacity to
relocate for work on several occasions. As he was approaching full repayment, Stephen
was hopeful he would now have the flexibility required to move and take a new job that
would further his career.
In addition to diminished job prospects or lost financial resources, exposure to
toxic accumulations of debt were productive of a sense of anxiety or lost “peace of
mind”. Tom cited this anxiety as a central force in driving him to work 60 hour weeks:
But also just kind of the stress, the burden of it, you know? I think… they say
money can't buy happiness, but it can certainly buy peace of mind. I think more
than the travel aspect of it, I think travel kind of plays into a larger key of just
liberty. You know what I mean? Where you have certain liberty depending on
how much money you have. You have a lot more options. And so you have… I
think it can buy you peace of mind, it can buy you liberty. Freedom, in a way, if
that makes sense. So I think the main motivation behind it was just sort of being
able to dedicate my financial resources to anything else [than credit card debt],
you know? It was such a drain on my finances. But it was also a drain on my life,
because I’d be like, ‘Okay, well I either have to work really hard and get this
taken care of, or I can work really hard and enjoy my life’. But I sort of had to
pick one. (Interview 9, 2020)
The squeeze of debt on possible futures (i.e. the pressure to “pick one”) is a defining
feature of debt-as -debility. By pressuring the horizon of possible futures which debt will
allow, debt is simultaneously rendering certain futures impossible while performatively
calling others into existence (i.e. having to work 60 hour weeks). For borrowers working
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60+ hour weeks to get out of debt, the struggle for recapacitation takes on a set of stakes
that ultimately decide whether they are to be recapacitated and “folded into life” or
debilitated and marked for “slow death” through continued overwork and financial
hardship (Puar, 2012, p. 153).
While a skeptical reader might respond that it seems obvious debt would carry
negative implications for borrowers, I want to close by pushing us to reframe normative
perspectives on debt in light of a frame that integrates capacity as a central project of
debt. Overwhelmingly, borrowers discussed their debt in terms of the potential futures
which indebtedness foreclosed. Whether that was saving for retirement, resources to get
out of a bad situation, or just a general peace of mind, debt wasn’t simply dispossessing
borrowers of these things, but was rather altering subjects in ways that reformulated how
they understood themselves and their relation to and role within the economy.
So what does bringing capacity into debt tell us about debts consolidated under
personal loans? Thinking of debt through the lens of capacity reframes popular notions of
debt guiding engagement with consumer finance. Typically, understandings of debt fall
into 1 of 2 camps: 1.) that debt is a resource requiring further efforts to educate and
‘include’ borrowers typically left out of the financial system, and 2.) debt is a trap for
people left out of the financial system to fall into. Both frames understand debt as static,
either as a resource or trap. Inserting capacity within this frame reworks static
understandings of debt and begins to understand debt as a catalytic agent for performing
or foreclosing possible futures. Drawing from Puar’s (2012) argument that cycles of
financial incapacitation/recapacitation are foundational axes of neoliberal biopolitics,
debt within the context of personal loans functions to render subjects as differentially
recoverable via these financial technologies.
4.5 Debt and Recovery
For those with bad debt, personal loans are marketed as a way out. These loans
function by providing unstructured capital to borrowers who can use that money to pay
off existing credit card balances. While it’s accurate to say that a personal loan replaces
one debt with another, borrowers felt that the act of taking a personal loan enabled them
to recover from debt and renew their claim to financial citizenship. This section examines
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the relations embedded in debt carrying financial products (i.e. personal loans), in
particular looking at how personal loans engage debt and indebtedness in selectively
recapacitating borrowers.
So how does replacing one debt with another enable the recapacitation of
borrowers debilitated by debt? For one, the mechanics of a personal loan are useful to
borrowers who often juggled debt across multiple credit cards and credit card companies.
Each credit card lender has its own payment portal, terms and conditions, as well as
interest rates that require borrowers to juggle multiple debts at the same time. The
cumulative effect of this juggling led to a sense of being overwhelmed and locked out of
a pathway out of debt.
Second, it’s important to note, consolidating credit card debt resulted in lower
interest rates for borrowers. While interest rates on credit card balances can range
between 16-24% interest, personal loans can be obtained for rates as low as 9%.
Borrowers I spoke with had personal loans with interest rates around 12%. On large debts
worth tens of thousands of dollars, the cost savings from consolidating credit card debt
under a personal loan could be significant.
However, even when taken together, the logistical and cost saving advantages of a
personal loan were discussed less often than the feelings borrowers had when they were
able to pay off long standing credit card debt. Seven out of the nine borrowers who
consolidated credit card debt felt that the loan reworked their position within consumer
finance. Articulated as a product which changed consumer mindset, personal loans
recapacitated borrowers through the conversion of bad-debts into more manageable ones.
A key path through which personal loans made debt more manageable was by
shifting the timetable of indebtedness. What had previously been an endless timetable for
repayment on credit card balances became a set 3-year or 5-year term on a personal loan:
I guess the best way to put it is... at least with the personal loan, you can see a
light at the end of the tunnel. You can see the light at the end of, oh, ‘you have a
five year term’, so that means in five years, if you make your payments you’ll be
done with your loan. For a credit card, if you make the minimum payment, you
might never pay it off. (Interview 4)
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For borrowers, this “light at the end of the tunnel” represented a literal timeframe for
exiting debt, but also a figurative way of describing the recapacitation of an idealized
financial citizenship. Many had spent years building credit before falling into debt, and
understood debt as carrying a series of mental and personal hurdles that were equally as
important to overcome.
In illustrating how personal loans function to recapacitate borrowers debilitated
by credit card debt, Sam articulated a series of “mindset” shifts precipitated by the loan.
Framing this shift as a renewed sense of control, Sam said paying off her cards “triggered
something in my brain” where “I can have control” (Interview 6, 2020). That renewed
sense of control was tied to a reformulated understanding of how consumer finance
works:
I think now my brain is like…. I literally perceive finance totally different. It's not
like, oh, I'm going to take this so that I can go swipe it. No, I'm taking this so I
can improve my credit score, and use it in a way that's going to benefit me. So
yeah, I think it's just, I’m a strategic thinker now when it comes to finance.
Instead of letting them exploit me, I can exploit the products that they're offering.
(Interview 6)
This mindset shift resulted in a renegotiation of the terms by which borrowers engaged
consumer finance. That distinction can be seen in the way Sam articulates the utility of
financial products, where previously they “exploit[ed] me” and now “I can exploit the
products”. That shift in how borrowers related to personal finance resulted in
recapacitated efforts to save, invest, and curb problems with toxic spending:
Now, I’m investing money into, like, you know, into the market and stuff like
that. I'm just trying to be more strategic and think long term. Like 30 years from
now versus “oh I’m going to go to brunch”…. So, now, it's like, wow, I feel like
I'm actually making progress with my savings account. I probably can buy a place
sooner than I thought I could. And like everything's going to be good, let's just
stay on track (Interview 6)
For Sam this process was particularly clear as she identified the “mindset” shift as being
“100%” responsible for her renewed ability to plan for the future. As she said, “the
difference in what you’re paying is not that much… it’s completely mindset because now
you’re not trapped. Now you’re in control” (Interview, 6). As evidence of this “mindset
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shift”, which I am understand as a recapacitated vision of financial citizenship, Sam was
able to leverage a well-paying job in a major metropolitan area to quickly start investing
in longer term savings and retirement objectives.
Surprisingly, for borrowers recapacitated by personal loans, the process of
“stay[ing] on track” did not equate to an aversion to debt. Described in terms of taking on
good-debts, many borrowers were eager to leverage the benefits of a personal loan in
accumulating assets. Linda had fallen into credit card debt after a rough semester of
college and waited several years before pursuing debt consolidation. Hesitant to take out
debt initially Linda illustrates how a personal loan altered her views on debt: :
Yeah, I think it opened the door for me to see [future loans] as a possibility.
Whereas before, I would have never even considered it. I was very debt averse.
But I was in a lot of debt, but I was afraid of debt and I just didn't know…. I didn't
feel financially literate enough to really feel okay about borrowing more money.
So I think that once I kind of tore that band-aid off, it became a little bit easier to
see that ‘Okay, this isn't the end of the world’. And actually, there are some
benefits (Interview 10)
When I spoke with Linda she had recently bought a home and connected her ability to
make that investment back to the personal loan. Ripping off that “band-aid” opened up an
understanding of debt that was not entirely punitive, and for many borrowers represented
one of their first positive experiences with the financial system.
Richard illustrates this point in discussing how a personal loan changed his views
on finance. Recalling how his family had been affected during the 2007-8 financial crisis,
Richard previously avoided debt at all costs. Despite being unable to pay off the loan as
quickly as he would have liked, Richard now tries to convince friends to take similar
loans in consolidating bad debt and positioning themselves to start building assets:
It comes with accepting the fact that you may have to go into a little bit of debt in
order to accrue some sort of wealth, and if you do it wisely, it'll actually work out
for you in the long run. Talking with you has sort of made me realize that the loan
was definitely more of a blessing in disguise than it was a curse. I felt like it was
kind of a necessary step in my life that I needed to take. Sounds crazy to say about
a loan. (Interview 11)
This idea that a personal loan was an unfortunate but “necessary step” was shared across
the interviews. As part of borrower recapacitation, the idea that “you may have to go into
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a little bit of debt in order to accrue some sort of wealth” was a common takeaway. I
want to propose that this commitment to ‘good-debt’ seen across these interviews is not
simply a byproduct of financial recapacitation, but rather a fundamental component of the
financial citizenship integrated within personal loans.
The important distinction here is that personal loans not only recapacitate
borrowers through the payment of bad-debts, but also catalyze the accumulation of gooddebt. This is key in an economy powered by consumer spending as borrowers “folded
into life” (Berlant, 2007) integrate within productive channels of financial citizenship.
This process of recapacitation is embedded in the financial technology of personal loans
as they work to differentially enable the recovery from exposures to toxic debt. As seen
in the next section, the capacity for recovery which personal loans draw from is not
universal and leave certain borrowers exposed to the reaccumulation of toxic debt.
4.6 Debt and Difference
For those whom the recapacitating technologies of personal loans failed, toxic
debts were reaccumulated and feelings of indebtedness intensified. Across the interviews,
there was a diversity of experience around personal loans as borrowers used the
technologies for purposes ranging from debt consolidation to investing. The question
becomes: why were some borrowers capacitated by personal loans while others were not?
There were two defining characteristics of borrowers who successfully used the
loans for recapacitation: 1.) these borrowers only used the loan for debt consolidation,
and paid down credit card balances immediately after receiving funds in their bank
account and 2.) successfully recapacitated borrowers articulated a claim to financial
citizenship lost to debt, but recoverable through a personal loan. As a result, most
borrowers successfully consolidating debt used the funds to pay down credit card
balances; however, the act of paying down those balances was only the beginning of
managing the loan. Borrowers had to discipline themselves to reduce spending in order to
keep card balances from creeping back up.
The inability to perform this financial juggling was the basis for borrowers who
were further debilitated by debt from personal loans. These borrowers often expressed an
initial sense of relief that later fed into the reaccumulation of toxic debts:
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I feel like what the personal loan does in the short term is allows you to sort of… I
don't know if I'd call it a false sense of security, but it gets your guard down.
Which I think because of how it’s marketed as this sort of escape, or a way out.
At least for debt consolidation. And while that is somewhat true, it's not the whole
truth. You know, it doesn't… It's a band-aid for debt. (Interview 9)
This marketing of personal loans as a way out of debt contrasted with Tom’s experience,
who felt personal loans were a useful tool, but can also compound debt and feelings of
indebtedness. The reality articulated by Tom is that when personal loans were used to
recapacitate financial citizenship, borrowers demonstrated an upfront ability to see past
the narrative of personal loans as a way out of debt and maintained financial discipline
once the “band aid.
Prior claims or knowledge of financial citizenship were necessary for borrowers
to maintain discipline despite initial feelings of relief. One borrower, Lindsey, talked
about the inability to curb spending after receiving her loan. She had taken the loan to
consolidate credit card debt, but because “when you’re already in debt, it’s pretty hard to
get approved for that high of an amount” (Interview 8, 2020), Lindsey ended up with a
personal loan on top of existing balances on her cards.
The combination of credit card balances and a personal loan led Lindsey further
into debt. Illustrating how a false sense of relief precipitated further usage of her credit
cards, Lindsey walks us through the process immediately after taking a personal loan:
It was a little bit of like, ‘yay, I did it!’, but then all of a sudden you start using the
cards again. I feel like when I still had a minimum payment on them, plus the new
loan—because I did on one of them—you know, I wasn't completely paid off.
That's when it's like ‘oh shit, this is not fun’, especially once it starts creeping
back up because you can't, I wasn't able to stop using them. (Interview 8, 2020)
Citing the feeling of relief combined with struggles for “self-regulation” when it comes to
consumer spending, Lindsey was hoping for a debt consolidation product that was “a bit
more outside in terms of telling me what to do and keeping me in check”. Frustrated with
the advice provided by the lender on how to consolidate debt, she found the charts and
graphics embedded in their dashboard pointless, or as she says:

40

It doesn't outright say ‘stop fucking using your cards!’, right? That's supposed to
be common sense, but for some people it’s not, you know? (Interview 8, 2020)
At the core of what I understand Lindsey to be saying is that financial “common sense” is
a prerequisite for accessing the capacitating properties of a personal loan. As Lindsey
identifies and Stuart Hall (Hall & O’Shea, 2013) reminds us, there’s rarely anything
‘common’ in common sense. What we understand to be common sense is an exercise of
power. In this instance common sense manifests in an idealized financial citizenship
disciplining borrowers to juggle debts and reduce spending in order to keep low balances
on credit card accounts.
Recent literature on the racialization of debt suggests race plays a foundational
role in determining how the exact same financial products (i.e. a mortgage, for example)
accumulate wealth differentially over time (Charron-Chénier & Seamster, 2018, 2020;
Seamster, 2019; Seamster & Charron-Chénier, 2017). Not only are financial products
used differently along axes of difference, but more importantly they are encoded
differentially by financial systems translating what counts as “good” and “bad” debt. In a
form of capitalism rooted in assets and assetization (Birch & Muniesa, 2020), the process
by which debt is converted into an asset or liability is of fundamental importance and
seen clearly in the case of personal loans. While this paper lacks the sample size to make
claims on how demographics affect the outcomes of personal loans, I want to close by
suggesting that differential holdings of racialized financial citizenship played a large role
in determining the outcomes of personal loans for borrowers in this study.
Personal loans can be either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ debt depending on the resources
which borrowers mobilized in repaying their loans. Whether the loan led to the
accumulation of new assets or the intensification of debt was largely a product of
borrowers’ ability to discipline themselves in ways that align with the middle class selfhelp ideology preached on subreddits like r/personalfinance. Structuring financial
products in this way functions to embed difference within how debt works. That process,
I argue, is illustrative of larger trends in consumer finance that order asset accumulation
in ways that benefit white, middle class financial subjects while “differentially including”
borrowers of color, women, and poor people within less productive or predatory circuits
of consumer finance. Future research needs to examine a broader array of financial
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products and the way everyday financial technologies ranging from personal loans to
mortgages are differentially converted into ‘good’ or ‘bad’ debt.
4.7 Conclusion
This paper mobilizes interviews with 14 borrowers of personal loans to better
understand forms of debt and indebtedness emerging out of the fintech sector.
Contextualized within a larger project examining fintech marketization of debt
consolidation, I show how personal loans are new financial technologies with distinct
consequences for consumers. The structure of personal loans distributed via financial
technologies capitalizes upon relations of capacity and debility embedded in debt. This
process results in differential recapacitation of borrowers as they engage and are changed
by their loans.
In the first section, I draw from borrower descriptions of indebtedness and extend
Jasbir Puar’s notion of debt-as-debility (2012) to build out an alternative frame for
understanding debt. This reformulation understands indebted social relations as a
dynamic process rather than an event, and puts forward the notion that debt can
simultaneously render certain futures impossible while performatively calling others into
existence. In the second section, I show how personal loans draw from these processes in
recapacitating borrower claims to financial citizenship. Personal loans provide the capital
for borrowers to pay off bad-debts, but also stimulate a “mindset shift” that encourages
the accumulation of good-debt. This recapacitation of financial citizenship saw recovered
borrowers go on to buy homes, invest in retirement, and save at higher rates than they
were able before a personal loan. To conclude, I show that while recapacitation was
attainable for many, it was not guaranteed. As Puar (2012) tells us, processes of
recapacitation/incapacitation are central to neoliberal biopolitics. The investment of
capacity within certain borrowers invokes the intensification of debt-as-debility for other
borrowers. The attainment of recapacitation is shown to rely on underlying knowledge of
consumer finance and prior access to financial citizenship that is inseparable from social
difference. This calls for a better understanding of how axes of difference encode
differential outcomes for borrowers using identical financial products.
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Now that I have shown the effects of debt on borrowers, I turn towards the
mechanisms by which these debts are produced. In the following section I will use an
algorithmic audit to make claims about the meso-level system structures (algorithms) and
broader political economy (banking relationships) enabling fintech firms to marketize the
debts seen in this chapter. The analysis presented in the following section involves a
departure from the individual experiences of debt and indebtedness; however, these
stories continue to ground my analysis on the potential implications of technologies
designed to selectively expand the availability of credit. Difference continues to play a
primary roll, shifting from a focus on the ways that borrowers are differentially
capacitated/incapacitated by debt to the terms by which they are offered credit in the first
place.
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Chapter 5: Making markets for unsecured consumer debt through alternative data
and machine learning models
5.1 Introduction
To scope out the algorithmic architecture and broader political economy of
personal loans, it’s necessary to first answer a seemingly simple question: what is
fintech? Financial technology (fintech) firms encompass a wide range of actors, products
and services tied together by efforts to integrate new technologies such as blockchain,
AI/ML, or platform services within finance. Ranging from business-to-business software
to consumer facing lenders, fintech is a broad and slippery category. While technology
has always been central to finance—from the economic models driving contemporary
markets (Mackenzie, 2008), to the first calculative techniques used to measure and
account debt (Graeber, 2014)—changes in technological infrastructure often bring about
changes in financial operations. Given the growth in infrastructure associated with fintech
around the world (Bernards, 2019; Bernards & Campbell-Verduyn, 2019; Clarke, 2019;
Langevin, 2019; Rodima-Taylor & Grimes, 2019), the dual impacts of fintech on global
financial networks and consumer focused financial inclusion necessitate further research
(Samers & Lai, 2020).
This project engages one piece of the broader fintech ecosystem by examining the
impact of alternative data and machine learning algorithms on consumer lending. The
following section analyzes the history of fintech experimentation and traces current
practices to academic experimentation with credit rating models between 2000-2010. As
peer-to-peer consumer lenders (p2p) lenders worked to overcome barriers to risk-based
credit pricing, they drew from academic literature on applications of alternative data
within futures of consumer lending. .
Taking that history and tracing the implications to present day use of alternative
data and machine learning in online consumer lending, I draw from an algorithmic audit
(Benjamin, 2019; Brown et al., 2021; Bucher, 2018; Burrell, 2016; Seaver, 2017) of one
fintech company’s ‘check your rate’ option. The audit uses 58 intentionally designed
profiles to assess the impact on loan approvals and credit pricing associated with two
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pieces of fintech IT infrastructure: alternative data and machine learning models to
process that data. The tests suggest Upstart uses educational and employment data in loan
approval and credit pricing, while I found no evidence that they use data associated with
ZIP code. These profiles show that alternative data volunteered by borrowers is likely
having an impact on loan approvals and credit pricing, with pricing volatility
concentrated within a particular subset of profiles.
Ultimately, I draw from these profiles to conceptualize two key points about
fintech consumer lending. The first is that contrary to industry discourse which frames
fintech as revolutionizing the operations of finance, many fintech lenders are operating as
technology providers for larger financial institutions. These cooperative hybrids leverage
risk-based pricing to selectively include ‘thin-file’ borrowers, resulting in price spikes for
newly ‘included’ borrowers. This technological accomplishment expands consumer
lending and stabilizes markets for unsecured consumer debt. Second, I argue that this
model is unfolding a network of capitalization that draws capital from a variety of
traditional community, regional, and digital banks to intermediate unsecured consumer
lending markets and host bank capital on digital platforms.
5.2 Alternative data and machine learning in fintech consumer lending
Emerging out of the peer-to-peer (p2p) lending industry in the wake of the 2007-8
financial crisis, fintech lenders leveraged early platform technology to match individual
investors with borrowers. These firms neatly fit Langley & Leyshon’s (2017) taxonomy
of platform capitalism which states that platform companies attempt to dis and
reintermediate services such as lending, charging rents for hosting those services on
digital platforms Notably, in developing a platform infrastructure for unsecured consumer
to consumer loans, these companies implemented a series of academic experiments
already underway by researchers (Deng & Gabriel, 2006; Edelberg, 2003, 2006;
Khandani et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 2005) in economics and business to use alternative
data and machine learning to mitigate the risks associated with unsecured consumer
loans.
That experimentation resulted in the calculative accomplishment of risk-based
credit pricing for unsecured consumer debt. The creation of individualized risk metrics
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derived from alternative data processed by machine learning models helped fintech
lenders corner the market for consumer loans (Robles, 2019). As these firms have
developed a track record of success in rating and underwriting greater volumes of
unsecured consumer debt, peer-to-peer firms would grow into a more formalized fintech
sector.
The formalization of platform lending had two important implications for the use
of alternative data and machine learning in U.S. financial services. First, the capacity to
use machine learning models to process alternative consumer data became a valuable
piece of calculative agency (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Fields, 2019). This led fintech
firms to drill down on narrow applications of data in ways that could avoid regulatory
action, such as Upstart’s recent no-action letter from the CFPB allowing machine
learning models to tentatively incorporate alternative data within their credit models
(CFPB, 2020). Second, the adoption of these calculative techniques has led to steady
growth and formalization in fintech consumer lending (Bahillo et al., 2016). In many
instances, that formalization has been driven by emergent partnerships between fintech
firms and banking institutions as financial capital from banks attempts to access the
technological capacity for risk assessment developed by fintech firms.
5.2.1 Academic experimentation in consumer lending
In a series of papers emerging out of economics and business literature in the mid2000s, academics explored the possibility of new data and processing techniques as a
way of bypassing barriers to risk-based credit pricing (Deng & Gabriel, 2006; Edelberg,
2003, 2006; Khandani et al., 2010; Thomas et al., 2005). Traditionally, risk-based pricing
for consumer credit was difficult for financial institutions to manage, as subjective
decisions by loan officers often replicated racial and gendered inequities and ran afoul of
fair lending regulations.
Industry responses to histories of racial and gendered discrimination in consumer
credit functioned to standardize the information loan officers were allowed to incorporate
within credit models. As part of that project, the accounting firm Fair, Isaac and
Company (FICO) introduced one of the first credit scores in the hopes of standardizing
and broadening the availability of credit. However, nearly 40 years later, robust credit
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histories remain elusive for much of the U.S. population. A recent report from the
financial consulting firm Oliver Wyman shows that nearly 50 million U.S. adults either
have a thin credit file or are ‘unscoreable’, meaning that they lack sufficient financial
data to generate a credit score (Carroll & Rehmani, 2017). Consequently, lenders’
response to uncertainty has historically been to avoid pricing decisions associated with
risk and either approve or deny consumer credit applications at a set price.
The challenge of appropriately pricing risk in unsecured consumer lending meant
that ‘thin-file’ applicants were frequently denied access to credit. Thomas et al. (2005;
2009) respond to this problem by arguing that standard credit models exclude a large
segment of borrowers and limit industry revenue. Signaling early 21st century
advancements in computation and modeling technology, they pull from management
theory to argue for a Champion / Challenger model of experimentation in creating new
models for risk-based credit pricing. Experimentation is key in this moment, as the
capacity to fully integrate appropriate data and modeling techniques was in its infancy;
however, the idea that algorithmic credit models fueled by alternative data could
overcome challenges to risk-based pricing would become key to the viability of fintech
consumer lending.
Several years later, Khandani et al. (2010) built on this idea by incorporating
alternative data into a series of machine learning models. Training their model to test for
chances of delinquency associated with bank balance and consumer transaction data, they
found that the application of alternative data to their machine learning model was able to
predict delinquency with 85% accuracy and reduce the bank's losses from 23% to 6%. As
new data streams became available to a wider range of businesses in the years after 2000,
it became clear that alternative data had powerful predictive capabilities for finance and
credit modeling. Where a borrower shops, what device they use to access the internet,
and even their social media (Berg et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2016) would all be evaluated
by academics and industry researchers probing the parameters of predictive capacity for
bringing new types of data into lending.
Notably, these first engagements with alternative data and machine learning
models occurred at the same time platform lenders were designing and implementing new
metrics for assessing risk in unsecured consumer lending. It is important to note that

47

proving data had predictive power in lending did not mean that data was put to use. Fair
lending regulations curb many of the potential uses of alternative data, resulting in
uneven geographies of algorithmic experimentation as firms test and train machine
learning models in countries which allow more expansive uses of alternative data
(Renton, 2017).
In the years that followed, researchers and practitioners drew from academic
literature in refining machine learning models using techniques such as random forest
(Bastos, 2007; Wang et al., 2012), support vector machines (Huang et al., 2007), and
neutral networks (Jensen, 1992; Zhao et al., 2015) to apply the predictive power of
alternative data. What this enabled was a partial—although very real—departure from
linear regression as the dominant metric for approving and pricing credit. Academic
studies such as those seen in Thomas et al. (2005) and Khandani et al. (2010) helped open
the door for platform lenders to tackle the problem of risk-based credit pricing and
establish the framework for an emergent fintech consumer lending sector.
5.2.2 Alternative Data
Academic experimentation laid the groundwork for present use of alternative data
in consumer lending. For example, the three major credit bureaus Equifax, Experian, and
TransUnion all have dedicated services to providing lenders with streams of alternative
data. Utilizing those services are a host of financial services firms ranging from Discover
to Goldman Sachs who have recently expanded consumer lending operations to use
alternative data to underwrite a rapidly growing financial product—personal loans.
So the question becomes: what data is actually making its way into lending for
personal loans? Credit bureaus regularly collect utility, rental, and cell phone payment
history as alternative data points to be bought and sold. The threat of regulatory action
has limited some of the more aggressive applications of alternative data by major firms.
For larger lenders such as Discover or American Express that are less inclined to
experiment with the risks associated with new technologies, alternative data from utilities
is considered less volatile and a safe supplement when engaging in risk-based pricing for
consumer credit.
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For fintech startups that increasingly see themselves as tech providers seeking to
accelerate the volume of personal loans, nonstandard data points have come to test the
limits of regulatory constraint as evidenced by a recent interagency statement issued by
the Federal Reserve, the CFPB, FDIC and the OCC. Cautioning that alternative data
introduces uncertainty into the assessment of compliance with fair lending laws, the
agencies advise firms that introducing alternative data into their underwriting models can
either “increase or decrease consumer protection risks” depending on a variety of factors
(Federal reserve, 2020, p. 2). Currently, cash flow through bank accounts, employment
history, and educational attainment are all variables used in consumer lending where 10
years ago that would not have been the case. Educational attainment, in particular, has
become a particularly interesting variable due to its socially saturated nature and its
adoption by multiple lenders ranging from Upstart to Discover.
As alternative data is used not only to determine whether a loan is approved or
denied, but also to inform pricing, fraud detection, marketing, and loan servicing, the
regulatory landscape surrounding alternative data is in flux. As firms actively engage
with experimentation, each lender tailors unique data streams to refine their credit pricing
models. While a piece of information such as where you went to school might seem like
a relatively ‘common sense’ (Hall & O’Shea, 2013) variable to incorporate within risk
models, when matched with the nonlinear machine learning algorithms discussed in the
next section, understanding how and why lending decisions are made becomes incredibly
complex and raises concern over how this data could proxy for marginalized groups
historically excluded from the beneficial aspects of consumer credit,
5.2.3 Machine Learning
Alternative data cannot accomplish all the work of risk-based credit pricing on its
own. For that project, fintech lenders have developed credit models capable of drawing
connections between likelihood of repayment and an increasingly fractured field of data.
Departing from linear regression, which establishes clear connections between specified
variables and the decisions rendered by a credit model, machine learning algorithms
enable the processing of alternative data and draw nonlinear connections between
variables incorporated within a model and the credit decision offered by that model.
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Algorithms using linear regression as the basis for assessing data points such as
debt-to-income or length of credit have been the hallmark of credit models since the
standardization of credit information under the Fair Credit Reporting Act in 1970
(Furletti, 2002). This approach provides a clear, linear connection between assessments
of creditworthiness and the variables used to calculate those decisions. The traditional
FICO score from the accounting firm Fair, Isaac and Company is the most popular
example of this model for credit scoring. Under this model, credit scores are calculated
through a weighted formula based on traditional financial information such as: payment
history (35%), Amounts owed (30%), Length of credit history (15%), New credit
applications (10%), and Credit mix (10%). While this method has been challenged in
recent years, models such as these allow us to understand and monitor credit decisions
offered by lenders and ensure compliance with fair lending laws.
In recent years, an emergent fintech critique has argued that standard regression
models lack appropriate data and insight to assess credit-worthiness in a world radically
different from the one envisioned in the Fair Credit Reporting Act. They argue that
models capable of drawing nonlinear connections between a more diffuse and fragmented
field of data are better suited to serve borrowers with limited credit histories.
Consequently, each fintech lender has developed its own model for consumer credit,
viewing these investments as proprietary technologies which function as a cornerstone of
their business models. For example, industry researchers at FinRegLab have shown that
cash flow data can be used in combination with traditional credit metrics to broaden the
scope of lending and better predict loan performance (Courchane & Baines, 2019 ). This
is one of several modeling approaches used by companies. Other approaches train their
models to process data associated with educational attainment, employment history or
type of income, and even intentionally designed psychometric tests.
While machine learning models have been successful in broadening the scope of
people who can be assessed by credit models, the nature of neutral network, random
forest, or support vector models make it difficult to understand which variables are
determining loan approval or pricing. The opacity of machine learning models (Burrell,
2016; Amoore, 2011, 2013) poses an as yet unanswered question for regulators unsure
how to assess compliance between nonlinear machine learning models and fair lending
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regulations designed in the middle part of the twentieth century. As Fintech lenders work
to carve out a market for unsecured consumer debt, they are engaged in a competitive
process of market making. The push by fintech to expand markets for unsecured
consumer debt merits close attention from regulators, academics, and journalists to
ensure that technological opacity does not come to cover for racial or gendered
discrimination in lending practices.
5.3 Auditing platform infrastructure: Credit pricing, loan approvals, and capital
providers
The empirical contribution of this section uses an algorithmic audit (Benjamin,
2019; Brown et al., 2021; Bucher, 2018; Burrell, 2016; Seaver, 2017) to document the
platform infrastructure of alternative data and machine learning models. Examining
Upstart’s use of alternative data and machine learning models to process that data, I draw
from recent investigative work by the Student Borrower Protection Center that showed a
hypothetical borrower with a degree from Howard University was far more likely to
receive an inflated rate when compared to a hypothetical borrower from majority white
New York University or majority Latinx New Mexico State University (SPBC, 2020).
Building from this work, I use multiple volunteers to test generalized categories of
alternative data and machine learning may have on loan approvals and credit pricing.
5.3.1 Method
To access that infrastructure, I created a series of 58 platform profiles designed
to audit algorithmic credit pricing through Upstart’s ‘check your rate’ option. Given the
centrality of ‘alternative data’, understood here as non-traditional credit data such as
education or employment history, I hoped to better understand how alternative data
points impacted two key outcomes: loan approval and credit pricing. For each of these
variables, I found evidence that alternative data such as education or employment history
is impacting the cost of credit and the likelihood of approval.
To ensure a diverse mix of traditional and non-traditional credit data, I recruited
12 volunteers to run intentionally designed profiles through the company’s check your
rate option. Since companies combine traditional credit data associated with the identity
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of a borrower with volunteered alternative data such as education or employment history,
this allowed me to manipulate the volunteered information in these profiles to test the
significance of educational attainment, employment history, and ZIP code while holding
constant credit history.

Figure 5.1: Screenshot from Upstart’s application showing options for educational
attainment.
Platform profiles reflected a potential borrower that lived in North Memphis or
Germantown, had a Bachelors in finance from the University of Memphis or a Certificate
from Empire Beauty School- East Memphis, were employed on hourly wages or were
salaried, and were either an insurance sales agent or a barber/hairstylist. These profiles
were tested in two batches, with the first 24 profiles testing for data associated with
location and the second 34 testing for data associated with educational attainment and
employment. Given the complex set of choices that went into crafting these profiles, this
analysis will reference Appendix A (see Chapter 3) in order to connect the reader directly
to the variables used in testing each profile.
Information from each profile was submitted to the ‘check your rate’ option and I
collected data on loan rates, approval/disapproval and the loan’s underlying bank
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sponsor. Collectively, these allow for a glimpse into the practice and capitalization of
firms using alternative data and machine learning algorithms in fintech consumer lending.
5.3.2 Where you live
Of the three variables hypothesized to impact loan approvals or pricing, ZIP code
(profile IDs 1-2 for each series) was the first tested. These profiles reflected an insurance
sales agent with a bachelor's degree from the University of Memphis living in one of two
Memphis neighborhoods. North Memphis is a neighborhood on the north side of
Memphis which is 79% percent African-American and 18% White with a median income
of $29,192. Germantown is a municipal area in Memphis’ eastern suburbs which is 5%
percent African-American and 87% White with a median income of $105, 292 (ACS,
2019). In a majority Black city, these two neighborhoods reflect mirrored histories of
racial segregation and public disinvestment which have driven disinvestment in
Memphis’ northern and southern neighborhoods while funneling wealth towards the
city’s majority white suburbs in East Memphis.
Testing for differences associated with this history of residential segregation, I
saw no evidence that Upstart’s model was more or less likely to deny an applicant based
on where they live. This is not surprising given the history of redlining and the focus of
20th century fair lending laws in curbing discriminatory applications of location data in
lending.

LOAN APPROVALS BY NEIGHBORHOOD
North Memphis

Germantown

9

9

3
3

APPROVED

DENIED

Figure 5.2: Loan approval rates by neighborhood.
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Similarly, there was no evidence of pricing differences associated with an
applicant’s location. While unlikely that a lender would incorporate location as a
significant variable within a risk-based pricing model, the capacity for machine learning
models to proxy variables associated with location bears further observation.

Credit Pricing by Neighborhood
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Figure 5.3: Credit pricing on three year loan by neighborhood.
As one industry executive told me, the technological capacity to locate borrowers
has far outpaced the ability of lenders to integrate these metrics as a result of regulatory
oversight (Interview 1, 2020). Future algorithmic audits should focus on a diversity of
geographic data which could be orthogonalized to have an impact on credit decisioning
and pricing. As major banks undergo digitalization and machine learning algorithms
become more common, new ways of interpreting geographic data are likely to follow.
5.3.3 Where you went to school
The second series of profiles would test for outcomes associated with educational
attainment (profile IDs 2-6 for any profile not denied in the location tests) . Alternative
data associated with educational attainment has become a popular metric for lenders
attempting to assess ‘thin-file’ applicants. A segment of these thin-file borrowers which
are particularly attractive to fintech firms consist of younger applicants with limited
financial history but lucrative jobs and advanced degrees. Upstart recently received a ‘no-
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action letter’ from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB, 2020) which tacitly
approved machine learning models for use in credit scoring, allowing Upstart to
incorporate alternative data within their credit rating systems. This regulatory stance has
made alternative data an increasingly attractive option for firms seeking to extend new
forms of credit while mitigating risk.
This series of profiles used volunteers to test two categories of educational data
which reflected a hypothetical applicant that either had a bachelors from the University of
Memphis or a certificate degree from Empire Beauty School in East Memphis. To isolate
the impact of education on loan offerings, I matched an equal number of profiles
containing a bachelors or certificate degree with relevant variables testing for
employment history.

LOAN APPROVALS BY EDUCATIONAL
AT TAINMENT
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Bachelors
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1
10

8
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Figure 5.4: Loan approvals by educational attainment.
The results showed a significant impact on loan approvals with a 94% chance that
a profile with a bachelor’s degree would be approved, while the odds for a certificate
degree were only 64%. Of the 9 profiles initially approved during the tests on location,
only 6 were approved when an identical application reflected a certificate degree. For
many users of personal loans, these unsecured lines of credit represent a pathway out of
debt. As a result, the stark differences in approval rates associated with educational
attainment represent a clear divider in access pertaining to these financial products.
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Pricing differences told a similar story where educational attainment differentially
impacted some profiles more than others. While the overall differences in pricing
associated with a bachelors versus certificate degree was nearly 3.19% more expensive
for a certificate, the results were most concentrated within a subset of profiles.
30.00%

Credit pricing by educational attainment

25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
Randy Leon Randy Gary Leon Gary
John
John Patricia Patricia
(4 & 6) (4 & 6) (3 & 5) (4 & 6) (3 & 5) (3 & 5) (4 & 6) (3 & 5) (4 & 6) (3 & 5)
Bachelors

Certificate

Figure 5.5: Credit pricing on three year loan by educational attainment. Each profile is
shown twice as the graph reflects four tests (Profile IDs 3-6)
While this graph shows an overall increase in credit pricing for borrowers with a
certificate degree, some borrowers were more or less affected by change in educational
status. Gary and Randy’s results reflected a subset of profiles which experienced minimal
differences in credit pricing when moving between a bachelors and certificate degree.
However, for borrowers like Patricia, a dramatic rise in rates was seen—doubling from
13% to 26% on a 3 year loan.
Searching for an explanation to the pricing volatility seen in these profiles, I want
to return to how this section began. ‘Thin-file’ applicants offer one explanation for the
variability in pricing associated with educational attainment. Incorporating alternative
data allows for platforms like Upstart to expand the scope of its loan offerings, while
compensating for increased risk through machine learning risk-based pricing models.
Emphasizing the power of alternative data when applied to these models, this sample
showed that education accounted for a 30% difference in approval rates and a nearly 13%
pricing difference for select profiles (see: Patricia-3 vs. Patricia-5 or John-3 vs. John-4).
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It is important to be clear that these differences are a result of how Upstart weights and
trains their credit models. As each lender weights alternative data differently, a new
world of potentially significant data points comes into view. Examining those variables,
especially ones as socially saturated as education, represents a key research agenda for
ensuring fintech lending works towards their stated ideals of financial inclusion and
broadened access to credit.
5.3.4 Where you work
The final series of profiles tested for differences associated with employment
structure (profile IDs 2-6 for any profile not denied in the location tests). These profiles
tested a barber/hairstylist working for either hourly or salaried wages, and matched an
equal number of bachelors and certificate degrees to each employment category. The
hypothesis was that employment structure offers predictive data which could proxy for
job security or consistency of income.
Much like the profiles testing for location, the data associated with employment
appeared to have no impact on loan approvals, suggesting that certain data points such as
education are used to assess loan decisioning while other data points such as employment
are not.

LOAN APPROVALS BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS
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Figure 5.6: Loan approvals by employment status.
Combined with the tests on educational attainment and location, this would seem
to suggest that some alternative data points are more important than others in regulating
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which applications are approved and denied. While employment may figure into pricing,
educational attainment appeared to be the most important variable for determining how
fintech companies regulate which ‘thin-file’ borrowers are selectively extended credit.

Credit pricing by employment status
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Figure 5.7: Credit pricing on three year loan by employment status. Each profile is shown
twice as the graph reflects four tests (Profile IDs 3-6)
In general, profiles testing for pricing differences associated with employment
showed similar levels of volatility to those in the educational attainment profiles. Given
that profiles testing for employment and education were paired together (i.e. an equal
number of bachelors/salary, certificate/salary, certificate/hourly, bachelors/hourly), some
of the volatility is likely associated with employment profiles reflecting a certificate
degree. However, several profiles showed spikes in pricing not associated with
educational attainment. For example, John’s most expensive hourly profile (John-3) was
5.25% higher than his most expensive salaried profile (John-6) and Patricia’s most
expensive hourly profile (Patricia-3) was 2.41% higher than her most expensive salaried
profile (Patricia-6). It is interesting to note that in each of these examples (Profile ID-3
and Profile ID-6) broadly higher prices are likely explained by each profile reflecting a
certificate degree; however, for profiles already primed to receive higher rates (John and
Patricia), hourly employment appeared to result in secondary price increases.
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This suggestive but inconclusive evidence required further investigation on the
role of employment information in credit pricing. As a result, I circled back towards
testing the second employment variable (Industry) identified at the start of the audit.
Constrained by platform security measures which limited the number of profiles I was
able to run through the platform, I matched profiles from the location tests (Profile ID-1)
with an identical profile from the employment tests (Profile ID-4). The only difference in
these profiles was the time at which they were tested (roughly two weeks apart) and the
industry classification associated with the profile (insurance sales agent vs.
barber/hairstylist).
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Figure 5.8: Credit pricing on three year loan by Industry.
As seen above, removing certificate degrees controlled for much of the volatility
seen in the audit. In its absence we can see some additional evidence that employment is
impacting credit pricing. Dwight, who was not included in any of the previous graphs
because he was only approved for one bachelors profile at the start of the study, was
approved for a second time when he applied two weeks later as a Barber/Hairstylist with
a bachelor’s degree. Providing another example of how applicants on the periphery of
credit access experience the largest swings in credit pricing associated with alternative
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data, we can see a glimpse of how the secondary and tertiary variables incorporated
within machine learning models could impact credit pricing.
While not as definitive as the data on educational attainment, it remains important
to consider how secondary and tertiary variables might impact borrowers on the
periphery of fintech enabled credit access. Ideally, I would have been able to test the
impact of industry on profiles with a certificate degree, but future investigations of
fintech enabled credit pricing could provide more intensive investigations of non-primary
variables and how those impact the availability and cost of credit for ‘thin-file’
borrowers.
5.4 Auditing fintech capital providers
A final series of data points drawn from this algorithmic audit were the
underlying capital providers for loans hosted on Upstart’s platform. During the audit,
each rate estimate was captured by a screenshot and later analyzed for underlying
financial infrastructure enabling the provision of platform mediated personal loans. These
loan offerings provide a glimpse into the hybrid infrastructure of fintech consumer
lending platforms as evidenced by the combination of a smaller regional bank, large
regional bank, and dedicated industry bank identified in these profiles.
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics on fintech partner banks.
Count
35
31
7
24
4
3

% Interest (3yr)
12.11
12.14
10.98
12.49
11.83
12.68

Cross River Bank
Bachelors (40%)
Salary (Profiles 1,2 and 4)
Certificate (60%)
Hourly (Profile 3)

1
5
2
2
3
2

9.30
21.12
17.07
17.07
23.82
23.77

Salary (Profile 6)
First Federal Bank of KC

1
3

23.91
12.55

Certificate (100%)

3

12.55

3
43

12.55
13.21

Customers Bank
Bachelors (89%)
Hourly (Profile 5)
Salary (Profiles 1, 2 and 4)
Certificate (11%)
Hourly (Profile 3)
Salary (Profile 6)

Salary (Profile 6)
Grand Total4

Fees

0%

60%

33%

While the distribution of loan offerings corresponds with the general size of each
bank and the larger number of B.A./Salary profiles run in the audit, we can see suggestive
differences in the credit risk segment targeted by each bank. Taking these differences as a
starting point, this section presents an analysis of the three banks identified to be
sponsoring loans on Upstart. I use publicly available data sourced from the Federal
Deposits and Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to examine each banks’ call report and
analyze their balance sheets. The diversity of banking institutions identified as sponsoring
loans on Upstart’s platform is matched with an equal amount of diversity in how these
banks are found to be allocating capital.

4

These numbers refer to the total of 43 approved profiles for which rates were documented. This leaves a
15 profile gap between these 43 profiles and the 58 platform profiles ran in the larger study. The other 15
profiles were denied; however, these were still included within the total count because they provided
valuable data on loan decisions associated with alternative data.
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5.4.1 Customers Bank

Figure 5.9: Screenshot from Upstart’s loan offerings web page for Bank Mobile, a
Division of Customers Bank.
Customers Bank is a large community bank based in near Philadelphia with a
total lending balance sheet of $10 billion. While still a community bank, Customers Bank
operates at a regional scale and takes a markedly different approach from the other two
banks in investing in unsecured consumer loans. That approach has led Customers Bank
to purchase a subsidiary fintech firm intended to increase digital connectivity and
specialize in consumer installment lending and student loan refinancing—each of which
are markets mostly operated online.
Customers Bank’s subsidiary has been successful in distributing capital through
digital channels. Of their $10 billion lending balance sheet, 12% (or $1.2 billion) is
attributed to “Other consumer loans” and 24% (or $2.4 billion) is attributed to “Loans to
nondepository financial institutions” on their Call Report (Bank 2, 2019). It’s important
to note that we cannot distinguish between student loan refinancing and installment
lending under the affiliate’s “Other consumer loans” category. However, the size of the
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balance indicates substantial investment in unsecured consumer lending, in addition to
direct investments in non-depository financial institutions which are often fintech firms.
The model illustrated by Customers Bank shows how large regional banking
institutions could enter unsecured consumer lending markets. Challenged with the market
share fintech firms have established in unsecured consumer lending, Customers Bank
purchased a fintech affiliate with existing infrastructure and expertise in serving digital
markets. They chose to channel capital through this affiliate, contracting with firms such
as Upstart to originate a greater volume of unsecured consumer loans. As we look
towards broader implications from this case study, the model set by Customers Bank
shows how major banking institutions could expand digital operations relatively quickly
as they navigate challenges posed by fintech banks and non-bank financial institutions in
unsecured consumer lending markets.
5.4.2 Cross River Bank

Figure 5.10: Screenshot from Upstart’s loan offerings web page for Cross River Bank.
A second bank identified in the profiles was Cross River Bank which is located in
the Northeast U.S. and has a total lending balance sheet of $1.7 billion. Unlike First
Federal and Customers Bank, Cross River is an investment bank set up to capitalize the
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fintech sector. Their business model revolves around platforms such as Upstart,
channeling capital onto platform lenders in order to build a market and supply for
unsecured consumer debt. Cross River Bank has been a key player in capitalizing
unsecured consumer lending over the past decade as they devote a majority of their
resources to providing the capital which fintech firms assess and lend out.
A majority of Cross River Bank’s capital is targeted towards platform lenders
offering installment loans. Of their $1.7 billion lending balance sheet, $912 million was
dedicated to unsecured consumer loans. At over 54% of their total balance sheet, the
percentage investment in consumer loans at Cross River is far above that seen at First
Federal or Customers Bank. In addition, Cross River has lent out over $200 million
directly to fintech firms for a variety of use cases (Bank 3, 2019). Notably, investments in
unsecured consumer lending constitute the largest area of lending for Cross River Bank.
As digital banks increase in both number and impact, Cross River presents an
interesting model for understanding how fintech aligned banking institutions could alter
pathways of lending and investment. Cross River committed early and consistent capital
to fintech consumer lenders, helping to stabilize what had traditionally been a risky
market for unsecured consumer debt. Although providing less overall capital to
unsecured consumer lenders than a larger bank like Customers Bank, early and
committed investment from digital banks have helped to stabilize fintech markets which
had traditionally been deemed too risky for traditional bank investment. As we look
outwards towards the ways fintech might change finance, monitoring the sites of
cooperation and investment between digital banks and fintech data and analytics firms is
key to future research.
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5.4.3 First Federal Bank of Kansas City

Figure 5.11: Screenshot from Upstart’s loan offerings web page for First Federal Bank of
K.C.
First Federal Bank of Kansas City Bank is a community bank located in the U.S.
midwest with a total lending balance sheet of $610 million. First Federal fits the profile
of a community bank, with a vast majority of its lending capital tied to mortgage lending
($533 million) and residential construction loans ($32 million). Historically, U.S.
community banks have been central to federal policies seeking to capitalize and structure
mortgage markets (Freund, 2010). We can see that involvement with First Federal Bank
of Kansas City as it structures the majority of its operations around the provision of
residential capital to construct and purchase single-family homes.
What’s interesting about First Federal is that mortgage lending is not the only site
towards which they are directing significant investment. Over $18.6 million, or 3% of
their total lending balance sheet is tied up in “Other consumer loans” which encompass
unsecured consumer credit such as the personal loans offered by fintech lenders5 (Bank 1,

5

This category of the bank’s Call Report encompasses all unsecured consumer credit. The two main
sources of debt included in this category are private student loans and installment loans (i.e. personal
loans). Since over 93% of student loans are originated by federal student lending programs (CFPB, 2012)
and there is no evidence of private student lending on this bank’s website (while there is evidence and
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2019). This represents the fourth largest segment of loans on the banks’ lending sheet and
is over ten times greater than the amount of capital allocated towards automobile loans.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of First Federal Bank of Kansas City Bank of
Kansas City’s consumer lending operation is the model it illustrates for community bank
involvement in platform lending markets. While the bank advertises its own personal
loans via its website, it also contracts with Upstart to originate a greater volume of
unsecured consumer loans. The reason for that partnership is likely the specialization in
data and analytics at fintech firms. For a bank such as First Federal, underwriting
unsecured consumer loans would be costly and time intensive due to the lack of data and
associated increase in risk resulting from unsecured lending. By paying to access fintech
lending infrastructure, community banks such as First Federal are able to originate new
pathways for local capital to mitigate risk and invest in a traditionally volatile market of
unsecured consumer lending.
5.5 Discussion
Algorithmic audits of financial services allow for a better understanding of
otherwise hidden infrastructure. In particular, this approach examines fintech
infrastructure in light of the alternative data and machine learning algorithms enabling
personal installment loans. Bringing this object oriented approach to the study of finance
and financial services allows me to conceptualize two key points about how fintech is
operating within consumer lending markets: 1.) fintech firms are invested as much in the
technology for issuing loans as they are in the revenue of the loans themselves and 2.)
that push by firms is creating networks of capitalization where a variety of financial
actors contract with fintech lending technology to access unsecured consumer lending
markets.
5.5.1 Serving financial services: fintech platform lenders as tech providers
The finding that alternative data impacted loan outcomes is significant on its own.
Across a variety of profiles and volunteers, educational attainment consistently affected

advertising for personal installment loans), I operate under the assumption that the majority of this
balance is accounted to installment loans.
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both loan approval and credit pricing. Employment status similarly suggested an impact
to credit pricing, with a less clear connection to loan approval. Despite equity concerns
associated with overhauling lending criteria via opaque machine learning techniques,
fintech firms are likely to tell you that their models functioned as intended. They would
point towards the increased availability of credit to ‘thin-file’ borrowers with a bachelor's
degree, and argue that increases in credit pricing accurately reflect risks associated with
limited credit histories. With no way for academics or even regulators (CFPB, 2020) to
comprehensively assess the ‘black box’ (Fields, 2020) of machine learning credit models,
algorithmic audits are useful in the sense that they provide tangible evidence on the
impacts of these algorithms when released into the world—namely that certain borrowers
faced price increases and significantly higher chances of denial associated with
educational attainment.
Perhaps most importantly, this audit provides evidence of risk-based credit
pricing and helps to contextualize a broader story of alternative data and machine
learning in financial services. Industry discourse has framed fintech as posing a challenge
to incumbent financial actors and institutions (Bahillo et al., 2016). While this narrative
of competition has captured much of the public imaginary around fintech, the practice
within consumer lending has produced cooperative hybrids between fintech platforms
specializing in data and analytics and traditional financial institutions looking to invest in
the higher margins associated with unsecured loans. The fluctuations in pricing seen in
these profiles signal an important shift by fintech lenders to enable risk-based credit
pricing as a market strategy.
The move by fintech lenders aligns with a broader literature on Technology-as-aService (TaaS)(Amoore, 2011, 2013). Socially saturated variables such as education and
employment are ripe for analysis by fintech firms, especially given regulatory non-action
on the application of machine learning models in underwriting (CFPB, 2020). The
application of platform technology within financial services is leading to a model of
Underwriting-as-a-Service which encompasses the ways that fintech firms have invested
in data and analytics technology in an effort to stabilize markets for unsecured consumer
debt.
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In this dynamic, alternative data and machine learning are neither revolutionary

forces fundamentally changing financial services, nor inconsequential media hype. By
allowing financial capital to access what was previously a niche market with trouble
appropriately pricing risk, fintech partnerships with traditional financial institutions
establish a degree of calculative agency (Çalışkan & Callon, 2010; Fields, 2019) over
unsecured loans.
Through stabilizing risk assessment metrics for consumer loans, fintech platforms
are able to open new spaces of investment. This process of marketizing unsecured
consumer debt (Berndt & Boekkler, 2011) is simultaneously dependent upon the
technological capacity of fintech to gather alternative data and incorporate it within
consumer credit models. However, as the next section will show, it is also reliant upon
processes of capitalization drawn from a variety of financial institutions. As platforms
host loan offerings from financial institutions, we can see new ways of capitalizing the
fintech sector emerge and better understand the way new technologies are catalyzing
circuits of capital within markets for consumer debt.
5.5.2 Who’s bankrolling the fintech revolution? Banks.
Each of the three banks identified in this algorithmic audit illustrate a different
approach to incorporating unsecured consumer debt within a bank’s balance sheet. First
Federal, Customers Bank and Cross River are all varying sizes, have different priorities
in allocating capital, and originated under very different circumstances. So what brought
a community bank, large regional bank, and digital bank together in capitalizing personal
loans on Upstart?
Financial infrastructures are key to understanding this question. Fintech firms,
successfully capitalized by banks such as those cited in this paper, have built a platform
infrastructure for unsecured consumer debt. The creation of new financial infrastructure
mediated by platform tech providers such as Upstart function to open new space for
banking institutions (both traditional and fintech) for engaging with consumer finance
and debt markets.
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Figure 5.12: Graphic depicting fintech consumer lending networks. Figure was
conceptualized from ‘desk research’ on the fintech sector, including interviews
with borrowers, regulators, industry executives, and attendance at multiple
industry webinars held during the summer of 2020
The graphic above depicts the infrastructure of fintech consumer lending markets.
As variegated forms of capital engage with fintech infrastructure, new ways of relating to
consumer debt markets are built. For example, a community bank capitalizing a fintech
platform could produce different results than an investment bank built specifically to
capitalize the consumer lending sector. While not definitive, this process can be seen in
Table 5.1 as each bank targets varying segments of the consumer lending market.
Importantly, fintech platforms allow multiple connections to be generated between a
range of banking partners, enabling banks such as Cross River to target applicants with a
certificate degree and higher interest rates, while simultaneously allowing Customers
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Bank to take a more conservative approach by targeting applicants with a bachelors at
over 9% lower interest rates.
Through this dynamic, fintech lenders are controlling the dis-intermediation and
re-intermediation of consumer lending (Langley & Leyshon, 2017). The strategic design
of markets for unsecured consumer debt allow firms to capitalize upon platform
technologies in taxing the revenue flowing through these newly created markets. These
profiles provide a glimpse into that process and show three ways that First Federal,
Customers Bank, and Cross River could constitute broader paradigms through which we
understand shifts fintech has brought about in the capitalization of financial services.
Customers Bank illustrates one path a larger consumer facing bank may take
when attempting to invest in unsecured consumer debt markets. Faced with continued
growth in fintech led consumer lending, many larger banks have been pressured to
rethink their hesitancy to issue unsecured consumer debt. Customers Bank chose to
acquire an existing fintech firm in order to expand its digital lending operations. We can
see the significance of Customers Bank’s acquisition with nearly 12% of their $10
billion lending sheet accounted for in unsecured consumer loans. For this reason, the
model illustrated by Customers Bank is significant not only because it shows how bank
acquisition of fintech firms could play out in consumer lending, but also because of the
efficacy of Customers Bank’s affiliate in moving bank capital via its digital platform.
Cross River Bank represents an investment bank set up explicitly to capitalize the
fintech sector. As digital banks continue to grow in a post-covid world, Cross River
represents an interesting model through which we might understand how new digital
banks may impact consumer lending. Cross River devoted the highest percentage of its
balance sheet towards unsecured consumer loans at 54$ of its $1.7 billion lending sheet.
As one of the earliest investors in fintech consumer lending markets, Cross River Bank
models how increased capacity by digital banks may result in unconventional forms of
capitalization with banks devoting inordinate amounts of resources towards propping up
a particular market.
First Federal Bank of Kansas City Bank of Kansas City represents a community
bank devoting nearly 4% of its lending sheet to unsecured consumer loans. Community
banks have historically been well positioned to offer flexible lines of consumer credit;
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however, the risk profiles associated with unsecured consumer debt meant that many
banks refused to offer personal loans. The significance of First Federal Bank of Kansas
City Bank of Kansas City sponsoring loans on Upstart’s platform is the potential for
community banks to begin investing in unsecured consumer debt markets. Increased
capitalization from community banks could mean more loans are offered and community
banks become more interconnected to markets for unsecured consumer debt.
The diversity of capitalization behind Upstart’s platform was surprising. I
expected to see a larger amount of platform loans being internally funded. However,
every loan offer seen in this algorithmic audit was sponsored by an external financial
institution. Each of those institutions exemplifies a different way of incorporating
unsecured consumer debt into financial business models. This is important because
fintech consumer lenders are establishing new networks by partnering with a variety of
financial institutions. Drawing from community banks and digital investment banks at the
same time, Upstart provides further evidence that fintech firms are designing networks
around their capacity as data and analytics providers, attempting to stabilize consumer
debt markets and host an increasing volume of loans through digital channels.
5.6 Conclusion
The consumer lending space is only one piece of a much broader fintech
ecosystem. As shown in the previous chapter, the emergence of fintech consumer debt
products (i.e. personal loans in this case) have subtly changed the way consumers in this
study think about debt consolidation and relate to their loans. Connecting to the argument
above that fintech of risk-based pricing is functioning to make markets for unsecured
consumer debt, these firms are changing the ground upon which markets for consumer
debt are built. Understanding fintech consumer lending firms as technology providers
which differentially make available debt consolidation products to certain types of
borrowers allows us to better contextualize the ways these technologies are used by
consumers attempting to navigate debt and indebtedness in their everyday lives.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1 Conclusion
To conclude, I provide a brief summary of each empirical chapter. First, showing
how personal loans connect to strands of debility and capacity embedded in debt, I argue
that personal loans are recapacitating technologies which draw from differential holdings
of financial citizenship in enabling recovery. Second, I illustrate how the technologies of
fintech consumer lenders are enabling firms to marketize unsecured consumer debt and
create new banking networks. Third, I examine policy implications and suggest a few
ways that insight from this study could be incorporated within practice. Finally, I leave us
with future areas for further research and consideration.
6.2 Debilitating debts and recapacitating loans in online consumer lending
The first empirical section mobilizes interviews with 14 users of personal loans to
better understand forms of debt and indebtedness emerging out of the fintech sector.
Contextualized within lenders’ efforts to make markets for debt consolidation products, I
show how personal loans embed relations within debt. Capitalizing upon relations of
capacity and debility, I show how these products draw from a debilitated but present form
of financial citizenship to determine whether personal loans—which were marketed as a
way out—enable borrowers to recover from exposures to toxic debt. Ultimately, I
conceptualize three thematics on borrower experiences with this type of debt: Capacity,
Recovery, and Difference.
In the section Debt and Capacity, borrowers recalled the squeeze of debt on
possible futures (i.e. the pressure to “pick one”). By pressuring the horizon of possible
futures which their financial situations would allow, debt is simultaneously rendering
certain futures impossible while performatively calling others into being. While a
skeptical reader might respond that it seems obvious debt would constrain borrower
aspirations, I push us to reframe normative perspectives on debt in light of a frame that
integrates capacitation/incapacitation as a central project of debt. Overwhelmingly,
borrowers discussed their debt in terms of potential futures which indebtedness
foreclosed. Whether that was saving for retirement, resources to get out of a bad

72

situation, or just a general peace of mind, debt wasn’t simply dispossessing borrowers of
these things, but was rather altering subjects in ways that reformulated how they
understood themselves and their relation to and role within the economy.
This idea that a personal loan was an unfortunate but “necessary step” was shared
across many borrower reflections on Recovery. As part of borrower recapacitation, the
idea that “you may have to go into a little bit of debt in order to accrue some sort of
wealth” (Interview 11, 2020) was a common takeaway. The important distinction in this
section is that personal loans not only recapacitate borrowers through the payment of
bad-debts, but also catalyze the reinstitution of financial citizenship enabling the
accumulation of new, good-debts. This is key in an economy powered by consumer
spending as borrowers “folded into life” (Berlant, 2007) integrate within productive
channels of financial citizenship. As seen in the next section, the capacity for recovery
which personal loans draw from is not universal and leave certain borrowers exposed to
the reaccumulation of toxic debt.
Debt and difference concludes with the idea that personal loans could be either
‘good’ or ‘bad’ debt depending on the resources borrowers mobilized in repaying their
loans. Whether the loan precipitated the accumulation of new assets or the intensification
of debt was largely a product of borrowers’ ability to discipline themselves in ways that
align with the middle class self-help ideology preached on subreddits like
r/personalfinance. Structuring financial products in this way functions to embed
difference within how debt works. That process, I argue, is illustrative of larger trends in
consumer finance that order asset accumulation in ways that benefit white, middle class
financial subjects while “differentially including” borrowers of color, women, and poor
people within less productive or predatory circuits of consumer finance. Future research
needs to examine a broader array of financial products and the way everyday financial
technologies ranging from personal loans to mortgages are differentially converted into
‘good’ or ‘bad’ debts.
6.3 Making markets for unsecured consumer debt through risk-based pricing
Consumer lending is one piece of a broader fintech ecosystem. As shown in
Chapter 4, the emergence of fintech consumer debt products have subtly changed the way
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consumers searching for debt consolidation relate to their loans. Connecting to the
argument presented in Chapter 5 that fintech firms work to consolidate markets for
unsecured consumer debt, this chapter shows how consumer lenders are simultaneously
making markets while changing the ground upon which consumers navigate consumer
finance. Understanding fintech consumer lending firms as technology providers engaged
with traditional financial institutions in making new markets for debt, I believe leads to a
better conceptualization of fintech as it manifests within consumer lending.
Starting with an overview of alternative data and machine learning in the fintech
sector, I provide an overview of academic experimentation with risk-based pricing in the
early 2000s. Framed as a significant hurdle which unsecured consumer lending had to
overcome, a range of academic and policy researchers speculated that new types of data
and processing techniques could better assess risk and extend credit to a broader pool of
borrowers. As early peer-to-peer firms experimented with metrics to rate risk on digital
platforms, they laid the foundation for emergent fintech consumer lending firms. With
recent investments in data and analytics infrastructure at fintech firms, I argue firms have
been able to overcome the barrier to risk-based pricing and have positioned that
attainment a vital asset of the fintech consumer lending sector.
Providing tangible evidence of alternative data and machine learning’s impact on
loan approval and credit pricing, I present an algorithmic audit of Upstart’s ‘check your
rate’ option. Using a series of 58 intentionally designed profiles, I show that education is
an important alternative data point to Upstart’s credit model. Profiles with a bachelor's
degree were 30% more likely to be approved for a loan, and on average received rates 4%
lower than a profile with a certificate degree. Further, certain profiles received rates that
were nearly twice as expensive when reflecting a borrower with a certificate degree
versus a bachelors. The strength of indication associated with changes in educational
attainment is evidence that fintech lenders have overcome barriers to risk-based credit
pricing and are actively incorporating these metrics in their business models.
Concluding with a discussion on fintech structure and capitalization, I leverage
these platform profiles to conceptualize the market strategy of fintech consumer lending
firms. Contrasted with the industry narrative that fintech is revolutionizing finance
through challenges to incumbent institutions (Bahillo et al., 2016), I show how fintech
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platforms are functioning through a cooperative frame, using their data and analytics
infrastructure to partner with traditional sources of financial capital. These platform
mediated partnerships allow fintech to stabilize markets for unsecured consumer debt
through enabling risk-based pricing on personal loans while taxing capital flowing
through the sector.
6.4 Policy Insights
Much of the ground upon which contemporary consumer finance is built relies
upon legal infrastructure from the mid-twentieth century. These policies and associated
regulatory bodies have important but complicated histories beyond the scope of this
project. For that reason, regulation is engaged minimally in this work, often mentioned as
it applies directly to the credit models at hand (see: Chapter 5). However, I want to
highlight two policy insights which could be drawn from this work: 1.) governmental and
non-profit applications of financial instruments similar to personal loans and 2.) the need
for updated legislation accounting for the growth in new data and analytical techniques
for consumer finance.
Drawing from borrower reflections on the utility of flexible credit, we could
imagine a suite of consumer oriented financial products issued by governmental or nonprofit agencies to assist borrowers in repaying bad debt. These loans were useful because
they provided direct capital to consumers; however, it should be noted that when issued
by fintech firms, personal loans are firmly entrenched within a paradigm of consumer
finance that profit from the inability of consumers to finance social reproduction
(Langley et al., 2019; Lazzaratto, 2012 & 2015).
As a result, movements for debt forgiveness have gained steam in the United
States during the covid-19 crisis. While it might seem a radical proposition for
governmental or non-profit agencies to simply provide consumers the capital to pay off
bad debts, the findings from this research align with calls from organizations such as The
Debt Collective in illustrating how consumers who have paid off debt are able to
integrate within more healthy, productive, and fulfilling economic circuits. The issue is
distributing these products equitably, ensuring that consumers most in need (not just
those with a bachelor’s degree) are able to access these products.
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Second, this research highlights the importance of credit reporting and fair
lending laws in determining how firms integrate new data within regulatory frameworks.
Currently, firms rely on a lack of regulatory infrastructure to be able to apply alternative
data and machine learning models. While regulators continue to monitor these
experimental applications (CFPB, 2020), there remains no unified approach for ensuring
that the opacity of machine learning models do not violate fair lending laws. Updating the
Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act/Fair Housing Acts to
account for new lending models would be ideal as firms are likely to expand applications
of these models in the future. Additionally, regulatory resources and oversight for
organizations like the CFPB are necessary to ensure continued and robust monitoring of
machine learning applications.
The policy recommendations outlined in this section are only partial solutions to a
broader problem of financing social reproduction (Lazzaratto, 2012 & 2015). Reversing
this trend involves the dislocation of everyday life from cycles of debt-based financial
accumulation. While that is a much larger project, policy proposals seeking to build
better lives in a post-covid world need to redefine extractive relationships between the
financial products many people use to survive and debt.
6.5 Future Directions
6.5.1 Theories on the racialization of debt
As fintech becomes more integrated within mainstream financial services,
additional research is needed to understand the implications of new technologies in
creating markets for consumer debt. Further theorization of the connections between
consumer lending and the racialization of debt are needed, and financial geographers
could look towards the work of economic sociologist Louise Seamster (Charron-Chénier
& Seamster, 2018, 2020; Seamster, 2019; Seamster & Charron-Chénier, 2017) as a way
to start. Understanding how financial citizenship differentially translates ‘good’ and ‘bad’
debts is a core component of the racial wealth gap which has recently received
considerable popular attention. With social studies of finance scholars (Birch & Muniesa,
2020) increasingly looking towards assets and asset ownership as a foundation for
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understanding contemporary economic operations, the role of difference in constructing
asset accumulation is a key area for future research.
6.5.2 Refining algorithmic audits in financial services
For those attempting future algorithmic audits of financial services firms, there
are a couple insights which could be drawn from this study. Given the attention fintech
lenders have paid to new types of fraud ranging from traditional to synthetic fraud,
platforms have developed a host of security measures designed to identify users and track
them across multiple applications. These measures significantly limited my flexibility in
testing these profiles, as the denial of one profile meant future tests from that volunteer
were locked out of the platform. Given security constraints, I found best practices were to
test profiles in order of likelihood of approval (i.e. testing first those with a bachelor’s
degree and a salaried job). In future audits of similar online lending platforms, that could
mean testing profiles from a variety of educational institutions and testing the most
prestigious institution first. Or using an algorithmic audit to test for industry (insurance
sales agent vs. barber), running all insurance sales profiles before the barber profiles. This
may result in a higher likelihood of approval for many profiles, and lead to fewer profiles
being locked out.
6.5.3 Fintech beyond consumer lending
It is important to note that fintech is much broader than the firms discussed in this
project. As a result, there are many other areas in which fintech firms are reshaping
dynamics of financial inclusion/exclusion (Lai & Samers, 2020). In conducting this
project, I attended industry webinars in order to develop a better understanding of the
fintech sector as a whole. One area that is worth monitoring moving forward is the impact
fintech payment services firms have had on the operations of small businesses. Firms like
Square and Kabbage have integrated lending within payment services, taxing small
business revenue in structuring the repayment of small business loans. As fintech
continues to redefine financial relationships between people, firms, and products, further
investigation of the sector is necessary.
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Appendix: Profile Variables
ID

Profile

Zip Code

NBH

Ed

Ed Inst

Income

Industry

1

Angela-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

2

Angela-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

3

Angela-3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

4

Angela-4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

5

Dwight-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

6

Dwight-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

7

Dwight-3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

8

Dwight-4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

9

Dwight-5

38107

NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

10

Dwight-6

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

11

Gary-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

12

Gary-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

13

Gary-3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

14

Gary-4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

15

Gary-5

38107

NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

16

Gary-6

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

17

John -1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

18

John -2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

19

John -3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

20

John -4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

21

John -5

38107

NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

22

John -6

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

23

Karen-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

24

Karen-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

25

Leon -1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

26

Leon -2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

27

Leon -3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

28

Leon -4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

29

Leon -5

38107

NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

30

Leon -6

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

31

Leslie-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

32

Leslie-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

33

Mike-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

34

Mike-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

35

Mike-3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

36

Mike-4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber
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37

Mike-5

38107

NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

38

Mike-6

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

39

Olive-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

40

Olive-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

41

Patricia-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

42

Patricia-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

43

Patricia-3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

44

Patricia-4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

45

Patricia-5

38107

NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

46

Patricia-6

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

47

Randy-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

48

Randy-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

49

Randy-3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

50

Randy-4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

51

Randy-5

38107

NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

52

Randy-6

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

53

Sascha-1

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

54

Sascha-2

38138

GT

BA

UM

Salary

Ins Sales

55

Sascha-3

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Hourly

Barber

56

Sascha-4

38107

NM

BA

UM

Salary

Barber

57

Sascha-5

38107

NM

BA

UM

Hourly

Barber

58

Sascha-6

38107

NM

CT

EBS

Salary

Barber

79
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